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Reviving Implied Confidentiality 
WOODROW HARTZOG* 
The law of online relationships has a significant flaw—it regularly fails to 
account for the possibility of an implied confidence. The established doctrine of 
implied confidentiality is, without explanation, almost entirely absent from online 
jurisprudence in environments where it has traditionally been applied offline, such 
as with sensitive data sets and intimate social interactions. 
Courts’ abandonment of implied confidentiality in online environments should 
have been foreseen. The concept has not been developed enough to be consistently 
applied in environments such as the Internet that lack obvious physical or 
contextual cues of confidence. This absence is significant because implied 
confidentiality could be the missing piece that helps resolve the problems caused by 
the disclosure of personal information on the Internet. 
This Article urges a revival of implied confidentiality by identifying from the 
relevant case law a set of implied confidentiality norms based upon party 
perception and inequality that courts should be, but are not, considering in online 
disputes. These norms are used to develop a framework for courts to better 
recognize implied agreements and relationships of trust in all contexts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Implied confidentiality is critical for meaningful and efficient communication in 
the digital age. Implied confidences can enable recovering substance abusers to 
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participate in online support groups, protect lovers who wish to be intimate using 
media, and allow Internet users to rely upon vague promises by websites to “protect 
their personal information.”1 Online relationships like these involve a horde of 
implicit signals, cultural practices, power differentials, and shared assumptions that 
can reflect an unspoken confidence between the parties. Yet, when these digitally 
implied confidences are breached, Internet law provides surprisingly little guidance 
for the betrayed. 
At best, the concept of implied confidentiality plays a negligible role in the 
developing doctrine surrounding modern privacy disputes.2 Despite almost 
seventeen years of robust online social interaction,3 fewer than ten publicly 
available opinions directly address the concept of implied confidentiality created 
via the Internet.4 So what accounts for the absence of implied confidentiality in the 
digital era? Empirical evidence and logic do not support the contention that the 
only understandings of confidentiality between parties in online relationships are 
explicit.5 Rather, a closer look at the doctrine reveals that implied confidentiality 
has not been refined enough to be a workable concept in many kinds of common 
social interactions, including online relationships. This Article demonstrates that 
although courts regularly consider numerous factors in deciding claims for implied 
confidentiality, they have failed to organize or canonize these factors. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See, e.g., Anonymity and Privacy, ONLINE INTERGROUP: ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, 
http://www.aa-intergroup.org/privacy.php; Caitlin O’Hanlon, Sexting Etiquette: What’s Cool 
and What’s Not, 29 SECRETS, http://www.29secrets.com/relationships/sexting-etiquette
-whats-cool-and-whats-not; Privacy Promise, CRRG, INC., http://www.crrginc.com
/privacy.html (“We promise to honor and protect your privacy.”); Carrie Seim, Sexting Do’s 
and Don’ts, BETTY CONFIDENTIAL (Dec. 11, 2009), http://www.bettyconfidential.com/ar
/ld/a/Sexting-Dos-and-Donts.html. 
 2. Of course, the broader concept of confidentiality is not completely absent from 
online disputes. Explicit confidentiality agreements have an undeniable presence in online 
privacy disputes in the form of claims for violations of privacy policies and the reliance on 
terms of use to justify refusals to disclose information about Internet users. But these 
agreements do not define the entire boundaries and expectations inherent in all online 
relationships. Indeed, given that virtually no one reads or understands online boilerplate, 
these agreements likely do not even scratch the surface of the true expectations and 
perceptions of Internet users. 
 3. See danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, 
and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 214 (2008). 
 4. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007); In re EasySaver 
Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (S.D. Cal. 2010); Google, Inc. v. Traffic Info., LLC, 
No. CV09-642-HU, 2010 WL 743878 (D. Or. Feb. 2, 2010.); London v. New Albertson’s, 
Inc., No. 08-CV-1173 H(CAB), 2008 WL 4492642 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008); Best W. Int’l, 
Inc. v. Furber, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 4182827 (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2008); Sw. 
Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3:06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761 (N.D. Tex. 
Sept. 12, 2007). It is worth noting that these cases all involve commercial, not social, 
disputes. 
 5. See, e.g., Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One’s Own: On Privacy and 
Online Social Networks, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 77 (2007); Andrew J. McClurg, 
Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied Contracts of 
Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887 (2006). 
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This developmental failure has resulted in the practical death of implied 
confidentiality online. “Offline” confidentiality has the advantage of traditional 
notions of readily perceptible context. Those seeking to disclose in confidence in 
face-to-face relationships can close doors, speak in hushed tones, and rely on other 
signals to convey a trust in the recipient that has not been explicitly articulated. 
Yet, online relationships are frequently perceived by courts as missing the same 
implicit cues of confidentiality that are present in face-to-face relationships. The 
neglected state of implied confidentiality is a problem because courts are 
increasingly tasked with ascertaining the actual agreement or relationship between 
Internet users who regularly disclose sensitive information. 
Courts have long validated implied confidential relationships and agreements.6 
Confidentiality often permeates contexts to such an extent that the obligations of 
the parties do not need to be verbalized or written down to be understood. In many 
instances, the articulation of specific confidentiality obligations could erode a 
relationship or impede its growth.7 For example, requesting confidentiality might 
send a signal that the person requesting confidentiality does not trust the would-be 
confidant without an expressed confidence. Alternatively, such a request might 
signal an assumption that the would-be confidant is not perceptive enough to know 
that a confidence is necessary. It would stand to reason, then, that given the 
abundance of intimate information and complex relationships online, implied 
confidentiality would play at least a somewhat significant role in modern privacy 
law. Surprisingly, this is not the case. 
The purpose of this Article is to confront the deficiency of implied 
confidentiality in the law of modern relationships with a proposed revitalization of 
the concept based on norms derived from previous cases. I argue that the concept of 
implied confidentiality has not been developed enough to be consistently applied in 
environments that often lack obvious physical or linguistic cues of confidence, such 
as the Internet.  
Implied confidentiality must be refined if the true intentions of the parties are to 
be reflected in the law. Courts need to strive for a more nuanced recognition of 
signals and a better understanding of deceptively contextual relationships. To that 
end, this Article uses Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of privacy as contextual integrity 
as a lens to analyze implied confidentiality doctrine and help create a decision-
making framework for courts.8 
This framework is designed to help courts ascertain the two most historically 
important considerations in implied obligations of confidentiality: party perception 
and inequality. When courts are presented with an implied confidentiality claim, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. See, e.g., Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180, 192 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 7644); 
Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123 (2007). 
 7. See, e.g., G. Michael Harvey, Comment, Confidentiality: A Measured Response to 
the Failure of Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2385, 2385 (1992) (“When an individual has 
disclosed such personal information to persons or institutions, she relies upon notions of trust 
and civility in social relations to ensure that it is not publicized.”). 
 8. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010). 
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they should consider the relevant factors identified in Part II and ask the following 
questions, which correspond to Nissenbaum’s framework: 
(1) What was the context surrounding the disclosure? 
(2) What was the nature of the information? 
(3) Who were the actors and what was their relationship? 
(4) What were the internal and external terms of disclosure? 
This nuanced framework will better enable the application of implied confidentiality 
in online disputes than the currently vague articulation of the concept. Implied 
confidentiality could be the missing piece that helps resolve the problems caused by 
the disclosure of personal information on the Internet. 
Part I of this Article explores the current diminished role of implied confidentiality 
in Internet-related legal disputes and the need for implied confidentiality in the 
unsatisfying body of online privacy case law. Part II examines the rich history of 
implied confidentiality in largely face-to-face relationships, extracting the most 
important factors for judges in determining whether an implied obligation of 
confidentiality exists. Based on these factors, Part III develops the proposed 
technology-neutral decision-making framework for courts in order to revive the 
concept of implied confidentiality on the Internet. This Article concludes that the law 
of implied obligations of confidentiality must be nimble, organized, and clear in order 
to effectuate the intentions of parties operating in rapidly changing online contexts. 
I. THE DEATH OF IMPLIED CONFIDENTIALITY (WHERE WE NEED IT MOST) 
In many ways, modern privacy law is a mess. The law inadequately or 
inconsistently protects individuals in a variety of contexts. The term “privacy” itself 
lacks a clear legal definition.9 But much of the problem with online privacy disputes 
is the fact that the most likely publisher of personal information in the Internet age is 
the person herself.10 The pervasiveness of electronically mediated communication, 
such as social media, has transformed many Internet users into their own worst 
enemies.11 The rampant self-disclosure of personal information is a problem because 
courts have struggled to determine whether and to what degree self-disclosed 
information is private.12 Lior Strahilevitz stated: “Despite the centrality of this issue, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087 (2002). 
 10. See Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2009); James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 
1197 (2009); Daniel J. Solove, The Slow Demise of Defamation and the Privacy Torts, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 11, 2010, 4:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-j
-solove/the-slow-demise-of-defama_b_758570.html. 
 11. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON 
THE INTERNET 196–97 (2007). It is a fact of modern life that individuals must disclose 
information that, if misused, could subject them to harm. For example, support groups like 
Alcoholics Anonymous or dating services like Match.com are social by design but also involve 
the disclosure of sensitive information. Police reports and medical records, necessary for 
response and treatment, likewise require the disclosure of very personal information.  
 12. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 
920–21 (2005). 
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the American courts lack a coherent, consistent methodology for determining 
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular fact 
that has been shared with one or more persons.”13 
The law’s inability to consistently address online disclosure is why the law of 
confidentiality and the context in which information is disclosed might be 
increasingly important to Internet users. Implied obligations of confidentiality can 
protect people revealing harmful information when explicit promises of 
confidentiality were not obtained. Although the general concept of “offline” 
implied confidentiality has a rich history, it is doctrinally unorganized, 
conceptually underdeveloped, and bereft of a unifying theory. 
A significant weakness of implied confidentiality doctrine is its tendency to rely 
on obvious cues of confidentiality that are unique to face-to-face relationships or 
are physical in nature. Patricia Sánchez Abril has observed the same problem in the 
tort of public disclosure of private facts.14 The absence of obvious physical cues 
online brings the undeveloped nature of the concept into clear view. This 
unorganized and potentially misguided approach to the concept of implied 
confidentiality has crippled its application in new contexts such as the Internet. 
Instead of exploring the cues and relationships augmented by new technologies, 
courts are largely shying away and deferring to the explicit text in dense and unread 
boilerplate agreements.15 
A. Privacy, Confidentiality, and the Digital Age 
Privacy torts, once thought to adequately address most privacy harms, have 
proved too inflexible or limited to adapt to changing notions of privacy.16 Privacy-
related legislation is a patchwork of statutes that can often be easily circumvented 
by online user agreements that few read and even fewer fully understand.17 Though, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 1 (2007) (finding that online contexts lack the traditional privacy-preserving 
mechanisms of physical space, such as locked doors and hushed voices, to protect 
information). In addition to protecting privacy, such mechanisms can also serve as cues of 
implied confidentiality to recipients. 
 15. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635 
(2011). 
 16. See Abril, supra note 14, at 4; Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy 
Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1918 (2010); Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus 
the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
97, 112–14 (2000) (discussing the hesitancy with which courts have applied the tort of public 
disclosure); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 
1057–58 (2000) (explaining that parties who contract to maintain confidentiality have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A 
Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 311–20 (1983). 
 17. See Jonathan K. Sobel, Karen J. Petrulakis & Denelle M. Dixon-Thayer, The 
Evolution of Data Protection as a Privacy Concern, and the Contract Law Dynamics 
Underlying It, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 55, 61 (Anupam Chander, Lauren 
Gelman & Margaret Jane Radin eds., 2008). 
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ultimately, many problems with the current regimes stem from our inability to 
articulate what information is “private.” 
From a doctrinal perspective, the law of confidentiality offers many benefits that 
are absent from the common law privacy torts and current privacy statutes. 
Confidentiality, which is, according to one definition, “the state of having the 
dissemination of certain information restricted,”18 focuses not on the nature of the 
information as public or private but rather on the nature of the relationship or 
agreement between parties. Even if self-disclosed information is not “private,” it 
could be disclosed in confidence. Under the law of confidentiality, courts can 
largely avoid the difficult question of whether information was private or offensive 
and focus instead on whether a trust was breached. Additionally, the law of 
confidentiality is less constitutionally suspect than the disclosure tort, which has 
significant First Amendment limitations.19 Yet this area remains underdeveloped, 
particularly with respect to online communication. No scholarship has thoroughly 
analyzed the various factors relied upon by courts when they evaluate implied 
agreements of confidentiality. 
This void has seemingly resulted in an assumption that courts will know an 
implied obligation of confidentiality when they see it. Implied confidentiality is 
found where it is “clear” that such an obligation would have been recognized by the 
parties to the disclosure.20 This assumption is not helpful for those seeking to 
enforce obligations of confidentiality, particularly in an environment like the 
Internet that has yet to be fully explored by the courts. 
B. The Law of Implied Confidentiality 
Although implied confidentiality has been touched upon by some scholars,21 it 
has yet to be well conceptualized in the literature or doctrine. This Part will provide 
a brief review of the law of implied confidentiality and demonstrate its extensive 
development in the United States. The long history of implied confidentiality 
makes its absence in online disputes all the more surprising. 
It is clear that obligations of confidentiality don’t have to be explicitly formed. 
They can be implicit parts of confidential relationships or created through implied 
agreements of confidentiality. These obligations can be inferred from customs, 
norms, and other indicia of confidentiality beyond explicit confidentiality 
agreements.22 Yet no research has examined which specific contexts, if any, are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 339 (9th ed. 2009). Ethicist Sissela Bok defined 
confidentiality as “the boundaries surrounding shared secrets and . . . the process of guarding 
these boundaries. While confidentiality protects much that is not in fact secret, personal 
secrets lie at its core.” SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND 
REVELATION 119 (1982). 
 19. See, e.g., Singleton, supra note 16; Volokh, supra note 16; Zimmerman, supra note 
16, at 293. The Supreme Court ruled in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. that the First 
Amendment does not bar an action for breach of a promise of confidentiality. 501 U.S. 663, 
670 (1991). 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See, e.g., McClurg, supra note 5. 
 22. See infra Part II. 
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important to courts when inferring obligations of confidentiality online or offline. 
Given the uncertainty surrounding privacy in the digital era, it is more important 
than ever to understand how implied obligations of confidentiality are formed. 
Obligations of confidentiality are found in multiple areas of the law, including 
contracts for confidentiality,23 the undeveloped tort of breach of confidentiality,24 
evidentiary privileges regarding confidentiality,25 procedural protections like 
protective orders to prevent the disclosure of embarrassing personal information in 
court records,26 and statutes explicitly creating confidential relationships.27 This 
Article will focus on implied agreements for confidentiality for specific disclosures 
and implied confidential relationships. The general test, which provides little 
guidance, is that courts will impose an obligation of confidentiality when an 
individual or other entity voluntarily assumes, promises, or agrees to confidentiality 
with respect to designated information or enters into a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship.28 
1. Implied Confidentiality Agreements 
Confidentiality agreements are binding agreements that prohibit the disclosure 
of information. These contracts are relied upon to protect anonymity,29 information 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 24. See, e.g., Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1428 (1982). 
 25. See, e.g., Richards & Solove, supra note 6, at 134. 
 26. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (authorizing protective orders “to protect a party or 
person from annoyance, embarrassment, [or] oppression”). 
 27. E.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2006); Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2006); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2710(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2013); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2006). 
 28. See Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for 
Invasions of Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 15 (1995). Daniel Solove and Neil Richards 
succinctly summarized the law of confidentiality: 
Confidentiality rules involve instances where one party has a legal duty not to 
disclose certain information it has acquired from another party. These rules 
include: (1) the breach of confidentiality tort, which imposes liability for 
disclosing another person’s confidential information if in breach of a duty of 
confidentiality; (2) the breach of an express or implied contract of 
confidentiality; (3) statutory provisions restricting the disclosure of confidential 
information; (4) protective orders preventing the disclosure of confidential 
information obtained during discovery; and (5) trade secret law restricting the 
disclosure of confidential information maintained by businesses. There are also 
other confidentiality rules not involving civil liability, such as criminal 
prohibitions on divulging certain kinds of confidential information, evidentiary 
privileges restricting testimony about confidential data, and statutory 
protections that limit the release of confidential information by certain 
companies or government agencies. 
Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1669 (2009). 
 29. See McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92, 97 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (denying motion to 
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in arbitration proceedings,30 details of settlement agreements,31 and trade secrets.32 
Additionally, the contracts are used to protect sensitive information such as health 
information, sexual preference, intimate feelings, and other similar pieces of 
personal information.33 Even quasi-contractual promises of confidentiality can be 
effective.34  
Implied agreements can arise “in fact” and “in law.” Andrew McClurg stated: 
“Implied contracts that arise in law are also called ‘quasi-contracts.’ Implied 
contracts arising in fact are based on the apparent intention of the parties, whereas 
quasi-contracts are imposed by law without regard to the intentions of the parties to 
create or not create a contract.”35 In other words, implied confidentiality 
agreements in fact arise when individuals actually objectively agree to 
confidentiality, but the understanding is implied in lieu of an explicit agreement. 
Implied confidentiality agreements in law are actually not “agreements” between 
the parties at all, but rather are impositions of confidentiality by the state “in order 
to do justice as a matter of public policy.”36 
2. Confidential Relationships 
In addition to agreements for confidentiality, an obligation of confidentiality 
may be created by entering into a special kind of confidential relationship known as 
a “fiduciary relationship.” The law of equity has traditionally designated certain 
relations as “fiduciary.”37 Professor Susan Gilles wrote that “[w]here such a 
relation exists, a fiduciary is under a duty ‘to act for the benefit of the other party to 
the relation as to matters within the scope of the relation.’ This duty, often 
                                                                                                                 
compel disclosure of a website’s anonymous users’ identities); Sedersten v. Taylor, No. 09-
3031-CV-S-GAF, 2009 WL 4802567, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009) (denying motion to 
compel disclosure of an anonymous poster’s identity from a news website). 
 30. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1211 (2006). 
 31. See Gregg Stevens & Lorin Subar, Confidentiality Is a Virtual Necessity, GP SOLO, 
Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 24, 24, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/publications/gp_solo_magazine/November_December_2012/gpsolo_november_december
_2012.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 32. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1125, 1153–55 (2000). 
 33. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965); 
Richards & Solove, supra note 6, at 162. 
 34. In the case of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed 
that the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel could be utilized when individuals 
justifiably rely on a promise to their detriment. 479 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. 1992), on 
remand from 501 U.S. 663 (1991). Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine designed to 
enforce promises that are detrimentally relied upon even though the formal elements of a 
contract might not be present. Woodrow Hartzog, Promises and Privacy: Promissory 
Estoppel and Confidential Disclosure in Online Communities, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 891, 909 
(2009). 
 35. McClurg, supra note 5, at 916. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Gilles, supra note 28, at 39. 
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characterized as the ‘duty of loyalty,’ includes an obligation not to reveal 
information.”38 
Like confidentiality agreements, the existence of a confidential relationship is a 
question of fact.39 Roy Ryden Anderson found that “confidential relationships have 
been labeled ‘fact-based’ fiduciary relationships to distinguish them from formal 
[fiduciary relationships].”40 Of course, there is no bright-line test for determining 
confidential fiduciary relationships.41 However, Gilles did identify some factors 
that courts consider in determining whether a confidential relation exists: “length of 
time of the reliance, a disparity in the positions of the parties, and a close 
relationship between the parties. It is ‘great intimacy, disclosure of secrets, 
entrusting of power, and superiority of position’ that evidence a confidential 
relation.”42 As will be discussed, Gilles mentions just a few of the many factors 
relevant to courts in determining obligations of implied confidentiality. These 
duties are not imposed lightly, and not every relationship involving trust and 
confidence is a fiduciary one.43 While confidential obligations can be created by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. Id. at 39–40 (footnotes omitted). According to Roy Ryden Anderson: 
The essence of a confidential relationship is fiduciary obligation. . . . Fiduciary 
obligation is the highest order of duty imposed by law. In the relationship with 
the principal, the beneficiary of the relationship, the fiduciary must exercise 
utmost good faith and candor, must disclose all relevant information, and must 
not profit from the relationship without the knowledge and permission of the 
principal. The fiduciary must make every effort to avoid having his own 
interests conflict with those of the principal, and, when conflict is unavoidable, 
the fiduciary must place the interests of the principal above his own. These 
principles are both basic and uncompromising. 
Roy Ryden Anderson, The Wolf at the Campfire: Understanding Confidential Relationships, 
53 SMU L. Rev. 315, 317 (2000) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
 39. Anderson, supra note 38, at 317. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 
AND TRUSTEES § 482, at 284–86 (rev. 2d ed. 1978) (“Equity has never bound itself by any 
hard and fast definition of the phrase ‘confidential relation’ and has not listed all the 
necessary elements of such a relation, but has reserved discretion to apply the doctrine 
whenever it believes that a suitable occasion has arisen.” (footnote omitted)). 
 42. Gilles, supra note 28, at 41 (footnote omitted) (quoting BOGERT & BOGERT, supra 
note 41, § 482, at 281). The Supreme Court of Texas held that “[a]n informal relationship 
may give rise to a fiduciary duty where one person trusts in and relies on another, whether 
the relation is a moral, social, domestic, or purely personal one.” Schlumberger Tech. Corp. 
v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tex. 1997). 
 43. Anderson identified three limitations on establishing a fact-based fiduciary 
relationship: 
First, the alleged relationship must be found to have existed prior to the 
transaction at issue. Second, the reliance by the aggrieved party that the other 
would act toward him as a fiduciary must not have been merely subjective. 
Third, the alleged confidential relationship may not be established solely by 
private agreement, but must arise sui generis from the nature of the 
relationship. 
Anderson, supra note 38, at 324. 
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contract, fiduciary relationships require more than a contract.44 Additionally, 
confidentiality agreements and fiduciary relationships can be simultaneously 
present.45 
C. The Need for Implied Confidentiality 
The reluctance of courts to find implied confidentiality in informal relationships 
is problematic because those relationships are the most likely to implicitly share 
expectations of confidentiality.46 The ascension of meaningful personal 
relationships online is one of the core parts of the social web. In intimate 
relationships, explicit contracts for confidentiality might be seen as inappropriate or 
unnecessary. Social norms and propriety might inhibit explicit requests for 
confidentiality in simple arms-length transactions, given the societal expectations 
that the recipient will keep disclosed information confidential.47 Indeed, explicit 
contracts for confidentiality are simply too clunky for most social interactions 
where they would be useful.48 Imagine trying to extract explicit promises of 
confidentiality via e-mail from friends before replying with a sensitive piece of 
information. Alan Garfield argued that a number of problems arise when parties try 
to use informal contracts of confidentiality to protect privacy interests.49 
 Eugene Volokh asserted that contracts, particularly implied obligations of 
confidentiality, are perhaps the only constitutional impositions of civil liability for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. Id.; see also ETHAN J. LEIB, FRIEND V. FRIEND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
FRIENDSHIP—AND WHAT THE LAW HAS TO DO WITH IT 111 (2011) (“Certain categories of 
relationships are virtually always treated as fiduciary in nature. They include attorney-client, 
corporate director-shareholder, trustee-beneficiary, managing partner-partner, agent-
principal, employee-employer, guardian-ward, and physician-patient.”). 
 45. In Snepp v. United States, the federal government successfully sued an ex-employee 
who published a book about his CIA experience for both breach of contract and breach of 
fiduciary duty. 444 U.S. 507, 507–08 (1980) (per curiam). The Supreme Court found that 
Snepp had “violated his trust,” id. at 511, by publishing his book, and the Court imposed a 
constructive trust on his profits, id. at 516. 
 46. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of 
Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 272–73 (1998). 
 47. See id. 
 48. Cf. id. at 277 (“An informal contract of silence may be found to exist after one party 
casually shared information with another, and later claims that the other party understood 
that he or she gave the information in exchange for a promise not to disclose it.”). According 
to Garfield, the more problematic contracts of silence are the ones created informally, 
particularly oral contracts. Id. Garfield noted that the “basic elements of contract 
formation—offer, acceptance, and consideration—are unlikely to pose any problems for 
contracts of silence prepared in formal settings.” Id. 
 49. See id. at 277–84 (describing the potential lack of consideration, mutual assent, 
objective intent, definiteness, and evidence in such contracts); id. at 282 n.98 (“Of course, 
one has to distinguish between a social engagement between friends, which is unlikely to be 
enforceable, and a commercial transaction between friends, such as a loan of money, which 
will be enforceable. A commitment of nondisclosure one friend makes to another would 
seem to fall somewhere between these two extremes.”). 
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speech.50 Andrew McClurg furthered this argument and noted that implied 
contracts of confidentiality might be effective for people in intimate relationships 
sharing information online.51 McClurg stated the maxim that “[p]romises can be 
made orally or in writing, or can be inferred from conduct” and argued that “[n]o 
difference in legal effect between express and implied contracts exists. The only 
distinction lies in how assent to the contract is manifested.”52 
McClurg’s central argument was that agreements of confidentiality in fact arise 
in intimate relationships because it is commonly understood in these relationships 
that certain information is to be kept between intimates.53 McClurg proposed that 
mutual assent to the confidential agreement is created “as a matter of custom and 
common understanding from the decision to participate in an intimate relationship. 
It can be inferred from the course of dealing between the parties and the overall 
context of an intimate relationship, including the manner in which private 
information is conveyed between intimate partners.”54 
Here, McClurg engaged in one of the few attempts to identify specific contexts 
that could give rise to implied obligations of confidentiality: “[T]hat private 
information is shared . . . between intimate partners outside the presence of others, 
often within homes behind closed doors and drawn curtains, lends support to the 
assumption that the tacit understanding of the parties is: ‘I’m sharing this with you 
because I expect you to keep it in confidence.’”55 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. See Volokh, supra note 16, at 1057. Volokh noted that implied contracts for 
confidentiality arise where “people reasonably expect—because of custom, course of dealing 
with the other party, or all the other factors that are relevant to finding an implied contract—
that part of what their contracting partner is promising is confidentiality.” Id. at 1058 
(footnote omitted). Volokh stated: 
I tentatively think that a legislature may indeed enact a law stating that certain 
legislatively identified transactions should be interpreted as implicitly 
containing a promise of confidentiality, unless such a promise is explicitly and 
prominently disclaimed by the offeror, and the contract together with the 
disclaimer is accepted by the offeree. 
Id. at 1060. According to Volokh: “The great free speech advantage of the contract model is 
that it does not endorse any right to ‘stop people from speaking about me.’ Rather, it 
endorses a right to ‘stop people from violating their promises to me.’” Id. at 1061 (emphasis 
in orginial). 
 51. McClurg, supra note 5, at 912. 
 52. Id. McClurg recognized: 
The central features of an implicit promise of confidentiality, shared by all 
[intimate, fiduciary, and otherwise confidential] relationships, include: (1) 
confidentiality is reasonably expected as a matter of custom and general 
understanding; (2) people part with private information in reliance on this 
expectation (in many cases, detrimentally changing their position in doing so); 
and (3) trust in the confidentiality of private information is necessary to make 
the relationship function properly. 
Id. at 913. 
 53. Id. at 917. McClurg argued that “[c]onsideration for the contract exists in the 
mutuality of the confidentiality agreement as well as in the broader emotional, physical, and 
other benefits each partner to an intimate relationship confers upon the other.” Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. Ultimately, McClurg still proposed the use of explicit confidentiality agreements 
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Online relationships are not devoid of confidentiality cues, but such signs might 
be subtle or as of yet unrecognized by courts, even if they are clear to Internet 
users. It can be difficult to articulate justifications for such trust. As such, implied 
confidentiality online might require a more thorough analysis by courts. Patricia 
Sánchez Abril has explored how courts might recognize online cues, such as 
privacy settings, as indicia of expectations of privacy.56 Indeed, virtually any aspect 
of website design or online interaction could be considered relevant in a finding of 
implied confidentiality.57 Yet no literature has sufficiently addressed the next 
logical question: How should courts determine which factors contribute to an 
implied obligation of confidentiality online? 
II. SEEKING ANSWERS IN THE LAW OF IMPLIED CONFIDENTIALITY 
The relevant doctrine is unclear about specifically when an implied confidence 
has been created and should be enforced. While courts and scholars have developed 
general rules for finding implied confidentiality, such as whenever a reasonable 
person would conclude an agreement of confidentiality was implied or whenever a 
fiduciary relationship exists, there is little explicit guidance beyond these often 
circular principles.58 Courts are largely left to their own devices and the facts of 
each dispute in determining whether a party was implicitly bound to confidence or 
whether an implied expectation of confidentiality was reasonable in any given 
circumstance. 
This Part helps remedy this dearth of analysis by investigating judicial 
considerations of implied confidentiality norms in order to determine how implied 
obligations of confidentiality might be formed. Specifically, this Part examines 
implied confidentiality disputes to determine precisely what courts consider 
important in the creation of implied obligations of confidentiality. Because implied 
confidentiality is entirely dependent upon context, this Article uses Helen 
Nissenbaum’s theory of privacy as contextual integrity to frame the analysis.59 
A. A Theory of Context for Implied Confidentiality 
As a general rule, courts look to context when analyzing implied obligations of 
confidentiality, but this approach provides little guidance in specific disputes. A 
better framework is needed. This Article uses the emerging theory of privacy as 
contextual integrity as a lens to analyze courts’ treatment of online and offline 
implied obligations of confidentiality. Because confidentiality is generally 
considered a type of privacy,60 this lens for privacy analysis is well suited for 
analyzing questions about the context surrounding promises of confidentiality. 
                                                                                                                 
between intimates, id. at 931, because of the “difficulty of identifying the terms of an 
implied confidentiality contract between intimate partners.” Id. at 929. 
 56. See Abril, supra note 14, at 42–43. 
 57. See, e.g., Hartzog, supra note 15. 
 58. See, e.g., Vickery, supra note 24, at 1456 (“A duty of confidentiality could arise 
whenever personal information is received from another in confidence.”). 
 59. NISSENBAUM, supra note 8. 
 60. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 479 (2006) 
(quoting Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government: 
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In short, the theory of privacy as contextual integrity is the theory that privacy 
violations occur when “context-relative informational norms” are not respected 
during information sharing.61 According to its creator, Helen Nissenbaum, the 
framework of contextual integrity provides that “finely calibrated systems of social 
norms, or rules, govern the flow of personal information in distinct social contexts 
(e.g., education, health care, and politics).”62 Nissenbaum stated that these norms 
“define and sustain essential activities and key relationships and interests, protect 
people and groups against harm, and balance the distribution of power.”63 
Developed as a model of informational privacy, contextual integrity is defined by 
Nissenbaum as “compatibility with presiding norms of information appropriateness 
and distribution.”64 Specifically, Nissenbaum posited: 
[W]hether a particular action is determined a violation of privacy is a 
function of several variables, including the nature of the situation, or 
context; the nature of the information in relation to that context; the 
roles of agents receiving information; their relationships to information 
subjects; on what terms the information is shared by the subject; and 
the terms of further dissemination.65 
Nissenbaum has also referred to these variables simply as (1) contexts, (2) actors, 
(3) attributes, and (4) transmission principles.66 Nissenbaum posited that context-
relative informational norms are characterized by these variables, which “prescribe, 
for a given context, the types of information, the parties who are the subjects of the 
information as well as those who are sending and receiving it, and the principles 
under which this information is transmitted.”67 These four variables guide the 
analysis in this Article regarding when and how courts consider implied obligations 
of confidentiality. 
B. The Factors Important in Implied Confidentiality Disputes 
Courts have decided a bevy of implied confidentiality cases. Yet they have left 
few explicit guidelines to show how they reached their decision and how future 
courts should analyze similar claims. The goal of this Part is to dig deeper into the 
case law to ascertain what courts consider important in disputes involving implied 
obligations of confidentiality. Utilizing Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity 
as a guide, over 130 cases involving implied obligations of confidentiality were 
examined to determine how courts consider implied confidentiality norms in these 
disputes. The cases revealed that courts gave the most attention to context and the 
                                                                                                                 
Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 455, 
458 (1995)). 
 61. NISSENBAUM, supra note 8, at 3, 129. 
 62. Id. at 3. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 155 
(2004). 
 65. Id. 
 66. NISSENBAUM, supra note 8, at 140−47. 
 67. Id. at 141. 
776 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:763 
 
terms of disclosure.68 However, all four factors of informational norms were 
relevant to courts. These numbers reflect only cases in which a court expressly 
considered one of the factors and where the court’s consideration was significant.69 
Each factor considered by the courts consisted of numerous smaller considerations. 
In aggregate, these considerations reflected trends in judicial decision making. 
A few themes dominated the cases. First, the cases made it clear that the parties’ 
perceptions of confidentiality were paramount in implied obligations of 
confidentiality. This could be seen most prominently in the courts’ focus on 
industry customs, sensitive information, confidentiality indicators, and external 
terms. Courts found that the presence of all of these factors contributed to a finding 
of an implied obligation of confidentiality because their presence made it likely that 
such an obligation was or should have been perceived by the parties. 
Additionally, after the perception of confidentiality, the most important factor 
for courts in finding an implied obligation of confidentiality was the inequalities 
between the parties. A disclosure involving parties that had similar resources, 
sophistication, or bargaining power was unlikely to be subject to an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. However, if the discloser of information was 
inherently vulnerable, had fewer resources, had less bargaining power, or was less 
sophisticated than the recipient, then an implied obligation of confidentiality was 
more likely than with similarly situated parties. 
1. Context 
The word “context” is defined as “circumstances in which an event occurs; a 
setting.”70 Because this definition is so broad, it is only minimally helpful when 
analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality. Nissenbaum defined contexts 
within her framework as “structured social settings characterized by canonical 
activities, roles, relationships, power structures, norms (or rules), and internal 
values.”71 However, this definition is also too broad for the purposes of this Article 
because it can overlap with other aspects of Nissenbaum’s theory. A more specific 
definition is required to separate the term “context” from the other three factors in 
Nissenbaum’s framework for contextual integrity. Thus, for the purposes of this 
Article, “context” is defined as (1) the relationship between the actors to a 
disclosure or (2) any external circumstance affecting the actors to a disclosure, the 
nature of the information disclosed, or the terms of disclosure. By focusing on 
relationships and external circumstances instead of the intrinsic aspects of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. See infra Part II.B. 
 69. In a number of excluded cases, it was possible that one of these four factors 
influenced the judges’ opinions, but because these considerations were not apparent, the 
cases were not included in the analysis. Additionally, in other excluded cases, courts 
expressly mentioned one or more of the four factors, but the factors did not appear to play a 
significant role in the legal analysis. For example, courts often would describe the job titles 
of actors in disputes where the jobs held by the actors were largely immaterial to the implied 
confidentiality analysis. These cases also were not included in this Article’s analysis. 
 70. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 397 (Joseph P. 
Pickett ed., 5th ed. 2011). 
 71. NISSENBAUM, supra note 8, at 132. 
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actors, disclosed information, and terms of disclosure, the term “context” is 
different than the other three factors. 
The cases revealed that courts routinely and explicitly rely on context when 
analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality. Over half of the cases analyzed 
considered context relevant in analyzing claims of implied confidentiality. This 
analysis of context occurred in many different types of disputes, including breach 
of contract;72 the breach of confidentiality tort;73 fraud;74 negligence;75 breach of 
trade secret;76 patent infringement;77 failure to properly disclose information under 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA);78 and waiver of testimonial, evidentiary, 
and Miranda privileges.79 All but a scant few of these cases involved offline instead 
of online disputes. Although an overwhelming majority of the cases were not 
related to the Internet, the courts’ logic and analysis of implied obligations of 
confidentiality could be applied to online disputes. 
i. Relationship Between the Parties 
The nature of the relationship between the parties is one of the most important 
contextual factors used to analyze a claim for implied confidentiality.80 Courts 
consistently found that long-standing, developed relationships were likely to give 
rise to an implied obligation of confidentiality because a developed relationship 
likely involves trust and custom.81 To courts, implied expectations of 
confidentiality were more plausible in developed relationships,82 unequal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. See, e.g., Givens v. Mullikin ex rel. Estate of McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d 383 
(Tenn. 2002). 
 73. See, e.g., Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 534 (Or. 1985) 
(in banc). 
 74. See, e.g., In re Estate of Scott v. Kemp, 316 A.2d 883 (Pa. 1974). 
 75. See, e.g., Thomas v. State Emp’t. Grp. Benefits Program, 2005-0392 (La. App. 1 
Cir. 3/24/06); 934 So. 2d 753. 
 76. See, e.g., RTE Corp. v. Coatings, Inc., 267 N.W.2d 226 (Wis. 1978). 
 77. See, e.g., Diodem, LLC v. Lumenis Inc., No. CV03-2142 GAF (RCx), 2005 WL 
6220720 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2005). 
 78. See, e.g., Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Cal. v. FBI, 749 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (S.D. 
Cal. 2010). 
 79. See, e.g., In re WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 344 N.Y.S.2d 393 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (per 
curiam). 
 80. See, e.g., Roth v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 656 F. Supp. 2d 153, 165 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(finding that “[c]ircumstances that may indicate implied confidentiality include . . . the 
informant’s relationship with the agency”) (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 
165, 179 (1993)). 
 81. See, e.g., Meyer v. Christie, No. 07-2230-JWL, 2007 WL 3120695, at *4 (D. Kan. 
Oct. 24, 2007) (finding that a bank’s privacy policy promising confidentiality resulted in a 
binding contract where, among other things, the plaintiff “ha[s] a long-term banking business 
and banking relationship with [one of the defendants]”). Additionally, courts were more 
amendable to claims of implied confidentiality where the party requesting or relying on 
confidentiality did not have equal bargaining power with the recipient of the information. 
See, e.g., L-3 Commc’ns Corp. v. OSI Sys., Inc., 283 F. App’x 830, 836–37 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 82. See, e.g., Ecolaire Inc. v. Crissman, 542 F. Supp. 196, 207 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (noting 
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bargaining power could inhibit the ability of vulnerable parties to explicitly request 
confidentiality,83 and relationships formed in pursuit of a common goal required 
confidentiality to be effective.84 The courts’ keen attention to vulnerability has yet 
to be as rigorously applied in most online environments. 
The Internet and social media have existed long enough for Internet users to 
form developed relationships, both with websites and with each other. Consider the 
average online community, such as a topic-specific message board or community 
weblog like the popular website MetaFilter.85 Active since 1999, users of this tech-
friendly community have developed long-standing relationships with each other 
and the website itself, which seemingly has no standard mandatory terms of use 
agreement.86 Evidence of these developed relationships and the norms that govern 
them could be explored in disputes involving assertions of implied obligations of 
confidentiality. 
ii. Custom 
One of the most important aspects of an implied obligation of confidentiality is 
that the discloser and recipient of information knew or should have known that the 
information was disclosed in confidence. For this reason, courts considered custom 
                                                                                                                 
in a trade secret dispute that an employee’s position as vice president “gave him access to 
numerous pre-existing trade secrets” and, as a result, an implied duty of nondisclosure). 
 83. See, e.g., Paul v. Aviva Life & Annuity Co., No. 3:09-CV-1409-B, 2010 WL 
5105925, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2010) (citing Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
808 N.E.2d 47, 52 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)); Fischer v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 
543 (D. Md. 2000) (noting the general rule that “an implied duty of confidentiality [exists] in 
circumstances where the parties deal on unequal terms, the transaction is more than an arm’s 
length deal, and one party trusts and relies on the other”); Hogan v. DC Comics, No. 96-CV-
1749, 1997 WL 570871, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1997) (citing case law stating “[a] 
confidential or fiduciary relationship exists between parties ‘where the parties do not deal on 
equal terms and one trusts and relies on the other’”(quoting McGahn v. Ebersol, 608 F. 
Supp. 277, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1985))). 
 84. See, e.g., Cloud v. Standard Packing Corp., 376 F.2d 384, 388–89 (7th Cir. 1967) 
(“Where the facts show that a disclosure is made in order to further a particular relationship, 
a relationship of confidence may be implied . . . .”); Fail-Safe LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp., 744 
F. Supp. 2d 831, 861 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (observing that a joint business venture between the 
parties “by its very nature implie[d] that disclosures made in the context of such an 
arrangement were confidential”); Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 309, 323 (Ct. App. 1979) 
(stating that among the factors from which a confidential relationship can be inferred is 
“proof of a particular relationship such as partners, joint adventurers, principal and agent or 
buyer and seller under certain circumstances”); Carpenter Found. v. Oakes, 26 Cal. App. 3d 
784, 789, 798 (Ct. App. 1972) (stating that “we have no difficulty in finding a fiduciary 
relationship established not only by reason of the agency created in the operation of the 
[non-profit’s satellite branch], but also by virtue of the long, intimate, personal friendship” 
between the president of the corporation and the defendant, a former employee); RTE Corp. 
v. Coatings, Inc., 267 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Wis. 1978) (“[A] relationship of confidence may be 
implied when a disclosure is made solely for the purpose of advancing or implementing an 
existing special relationship . . . .”). 
 85. METAFILTER, http://www.metafilter.com/. 
 86. See Noor Ali-Hasan, MetaFilter: An Analysis of a Community Weblog, NOOR AT 
WORK (Apr. 20, 2005), http://www.nooratwork.com/pdf/ali-hasan_metafilter.pdf. 
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a very significant factor in analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality.87 If 
confidentiality was a regular and accepted practice in a given context, courts often 
found a discloser’s reliance on that custom reasonable.88 This reliance was 
reasonable because the common knowledge of a custom made it likely that the 
recipient of the information was aware of an expectation of confidentiality before 
the information was disclosed, or, in any event, the recipient should have known to 
keep the information confidential. 
Courts found two types of customs important: (1) party customs and (2) industry 
customs. Courts were likely to find an implied obligation of confidentiality for 
parties if they offered or required confidences in previous, similar contexts.89 
Industry customs of confidentiality, most commonly found in intellectual property 
disputes, were important to courts if confidentiality was a commonly accepted 
practice in any given industry, though not necessarily the custom of the parties 
currently requesting or being charged with an obligation of confidentiality. A 
custom of confidentiality should be firmly established to be legally binding.90 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. See Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., No. CV-00-02279 CAS, 2000 WL 979664, at *7–8 
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2000) (recognizing that, if proven, the television industry’s practice of 
implied confidentiality in all pitch meetings supported a plaintiff’s claim for breach of 
confidence); Bergin v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., No. 98 Civ. 8075 (JGK), 2000 WL 
223833, at *2, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2000); Markogianis v. Burger King Corp., No. 95 
CIV.4627 (JFK), 1997 WL 167113, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1997) (“Industry custom can 
create an implied-in-fact contract between the parties . . . .”); Moore v. Marty Gilman, Inc., 
965 F. Supp. 203, 213–17 (D. Mass. 1997) (detailing the importance of customs in implied 
confidential relationships that are necessary to protect a trade secret); Prescott v. Morton 
Int’l, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 404, 410 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding that “a genuine issue of material 
fact exists as to whether the parties’ conduct would lead a reasonable person in the industry 
to infer that Morton promised not to use the information in the design plans without 
authorization”); Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1204, 1217–18 
(E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 88. See, e.g., Markogianis, 1997 WL 167113, at *5. 
 89. See, e.g., Moore, 965 F. Supp. at 214 (citing Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 592 F. 
Supp. 1021, 1027 (D.R.I. 1984) (noting that in previous cases, a business’s adherence to an 
industry custom of confidentiality was a key point in determining whether an implied 
confidential relationship existed)); cf. MIT v. Harman Int’l Indus., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 297, 
304–05 (D. Mass. 2008) (finding no implied obligation of confidentiality where, among 
other things, the researchers “failed to support the notion that there is a ‘recognized culture 
that would preclude, or at least inhibit, most of the participants in the field tests from 
disclosing information . . . to others’”). 
 90. Star Patrol Enters. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 129 F.3d 127, 127 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(unpublished table decision) (finding that “[p]roper and competent proof of an industry 
custom and usage which created an obligation on the part of the defendants might form part 
of the [circumstances]” that can demonstrate voluntary acceptance of confidentiality); 
Fischer v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 544 (D. Md. 2000) (observing that the 
“commonplace give-and-take between those who ‘pitch’ ideas and those who listen and 
consider” was not enough of a custom to give rise to a duty of confidentiality); Markogianis, 
1997 WL 167113, at *5 (“Industry custom can create an implied-in-fact contract between the 
parties, resulting in the requisite legal relationship needed to support a misappropriation 
claim.”). 
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The growth of e-commerce would seem to pave the way for industry and party 
norms of confidentiality and privacy. Indeed, some websites explicitly tout their 
common practice of never selling or sharing information with third parties.91 
Although these statements appear outside the language of the websites’ privacy 
policies, it seems that such statements of company practices would count as 
evidence of a party custom (and in the aggregate, perhaps an industry custom) of 
implied confidentiality. 
iii. Negotiation 
Courts have had varying opinions on how negotiations should impact an 
inference of confidentiality. Some courts opined that a lack of negotiation reflected 
an absence of the “meeting of the minds” necessary for true agreement between the 
parties. 92 Other courts looked to whether the parties were negotiating at “arm’s-
length,” defined as “[o]f or relating to dealings between two parties who are not 
related or not on close terms and who are presumed to have roughly equal 
bargaining power; not involving a confidential relationship.”93 For courts, “arms-
length negotiations” tended to serve as evidence of ample opportunity to explicitly 
request confidentiality, with the implication that the failure to exploit that 
opportunity meant that an implied obligation of confidentiality was unlikely.94 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. See, e.g., CBS News, Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook: What’s Next?, 60 MINUTES, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18560_162-7108060.html (“We never sell your information. 
Advertisers who are using the site never get access to your information.” (quoting Facebook 
founder Mark Zuckerberg)). 
 92. Meyer v. Christie, No. 07-2230-JWL, 2007 WL 3120695, at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 
2007) (finding that “the terms of the manual were not bargained for by the parties” and “[n]o 
‘meeting of the minds’ occurred”). 
 93. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 123 (9th ed. 2009). 
 94. See, e.g., Fischer, 115 F. Supp. at 544 (finding that “[r]ather than establishing a 
relationship of trust and confidentiality . . . [plaintiff] merely contacted [defendant and] . . . 
asked to keep ‘the details of the series on file’” with no explicit promise of confidentiality). 
The court found it important to describe the fact that “[t]hese alleged facts describe the 
parties acting at arm’s length, with no prior dealings, no promise of confidentiality, and no 
employment or personal relationship that could give rise to a duty of trust.” Id.; see also 
Ranger Enters., Inc. v. Leen & Assocs., Inc., No. 97-35077, 97-35078, 1998 WL 668380, at 
*6 (9th Cir. Sept. 21, 1998); Star Patrol, 1997 WL 683327, at *2 (“An action for breach of 
confidential relationship would necessarily fail because the arms-length business relationship 
between Star Patrol and the defendants is insufficient to impose fiduciary-like duties that 
arise from a confidential relationship.”); Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F. 
Supp. 1204, 1218 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that the creation of a confidential relationship 
would be “unduly burdensome and unwarranted in policy where the sole contract between 
the parties has been the arms-length submission of an idea”). Failed negotiations for 
confidentiality were also relevant to some courts because they indicated that an implied 
obligation of confidentiality was likely. See, e.g., L-3 Commc’ns. Corp. v. OSI Sys., Inc., 
283 F. App’x 830, 836 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that no obligation of confidentiality existed in 
an intellectual property dispute where the plaintiff could have, but failed to, insist upon 
“explicit contract terms providing that L-3 would act in a fiduciary capacity”); Omnitech 
Int’l, Inc. v. Colorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316, 1331 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that no confidential 
relationship existed in a trade-secret dispute where, among other things, the parties “had only 
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Boilerplate contracts used by websites are rarely open to negotiation. However, 
to the extent an actual agreement exists between Internet users, courts reviewing 
claims by those who are more likely to be negotiating at arm’s length and who are 
not on close terms and have similar bargaining power would likely find these 
factors weigh against a finding of implied confidentiality. For example, users of the 
popular online classifieds on the website Craigslist are often strangers engaging in 
discrete or “one-time-only” transactions with each other and can easily negotiate 
for confidentiality as part of their agreement if they so desire.95 Thus, if they fail to 
do so, a court might be hesitant to find that confidentiality was implied. A different 
analysis might apply to users who are on closer terms or involved in more 
developed relationships. 
iv. Timing of the Disclosure 
The timing of the disclosure of information was significant for courts, as they 
were loathe to imply confidentiality when disclosures occurred before a promise of 
confidentiality was made or before a substantive relationship was formed.96 By 
                                                                                                                 
an arms-length business relationship” and “the parties vigorously negotiated the agreements 
ultimately executed”); Fail-Safe LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp., 744 F. Supp. 2d 831, 860–61 
(E.D. Wis. 2010) (finding no implied confidential relationship where the plaintiff “willingly 
agreed to a confidentiality agreement that clearly protected [the defendant’s] proprietary 
information, but did nothing to protect [its own] information provided an obvious signal to 
[the defendant] that [the plaintiff] ‘knew how to ask that information be considered 
confidential if it really thought the company’s crown jewels were at risk’”); Young Design, 
Inc. v. Teletronics Int’l, Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-970-A, 2001 WL 35804500, at *5 (E.D. Va. July 
31, 2001) (finding no implied confidential relationship where the plaintiff “did not require 
[the defendant] to sign non-disclosure agreement of any kind” and there was no evidence the 
plaintiff “probed . . . for any explicit commitment to keep the . . . technology confidential” 
after the defendant refused to sign a non-disclosure agreement during a business meeting). 
 95. See Jonathan Strickland, How Craigslist Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
http://money.howstuffworks.com/craigslist.htm (“All transactions are between the person 
who posted the ad and the person responding to it. Craigslist's employees don't get involved 
in any transactions or discussions unless someone reports a problem.”). 
 96. See, e.g., Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 581 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(“Reliance on confidentiality, however, must exist at the time the disclosure is made. An 
attempt to establish a special relationship long after an initial disclosure comes too late.”); 
Hoeltke v. C.M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912, 923 (4th Cir. 1935); Keane v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 921, 942 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (“The idea man who blurts out his 
idea without having first made his bargain—whether in a so-called sales packet, Internet 
postings, or discussions with family members and callow undergraduate students—‘has no 
one but himself to blame for the loss of his bargaining power.’”); Holloman v. O. Mustad & 
Sons (USA), Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 450, 460 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (finding that no confidentiality 
obligation existed where the plaintiff admitted to revealing a trade secret to others for testing 
purposes without first entering into nondisclosure agreements with those people); Kleck v. 
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 819, 824 (W.D. Tex. 2000); Metrano v. Fox Broad. 
Co., No. CV-00-02279 CAS JWJX, 2000 WL 979664, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2000) 
(finding that “[n]othing in the pleadings suggests that plaintiff communicated to defendant 
the requirement of confidentiality before the presentation”); Learning Curve Toys, L.L.C. v. 
PlayWood Toys, Inc., No. 94 C 6884, 1998 WL 46894, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1998) 
(referencing testimony that supported the fact that the parties “arrived at a confidentiality 
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focusing on timing, the courts seem to be trying to ensure that the recipient of the 
information had the opportunity to either decline confidentiality or refrain from 
entering into a relationship with confidentiality obligations. Courts will not infer 
confidentiality unilaterally. A promise of confidentiality or decision to enter into a 
confidential relationship must be voluntary by both parties.97 
v. Purpose of the Disclosure 
Courts regularly looked to the purpose of the disclosure of information to 
determine if an implied obligation of confidentiality existed.98 Courts considered 
disclosures made in order to promote a common goal or further develop the 
relationship as evidence of an implied obligation of confidentiality.99 Courts 
                                                                                                                 
agreement prior to sharing information with each other”); Vantage Point, 529 F. Supp. at 
1217 (“[T]he mere voluntary act of submitting an idea to one with whom the plaintiff has 
had no prior dealings will not make the disclosure one in confidence, even if stated to be so. 
A person may not ‘by his gratuitous and unilateral act, . . . impose upon another a 
confidential relationship.’” (omission in original) (quoting Official Airlines Schedule Info. 
Serv., Inc. v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 672, 674 (5th Cir. 1964))); Klekas v. EMI Films, 
Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1102 (Ct. App. 1984); Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 309, 323–24 
(Ct. App. 1979); RTE Corp. v. Coatings, Inc., 267 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Wis. 1978) (finding 
that “[t]he contract clause came too late to protect the confidentiality of the drawing, which 
had been disclosed at an earlier time”). But cf. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game 
Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 490 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that a disclosure might have been 
made in confidence even if the disclosure preceded any conduct on the recipient’s part 
indicating the existence of an implied-in-fact contract). 
 97. See, e.g., Innospan Corp. v. Intuit, Inc., No. C 10-04422 WHA, 2011 WL 856265, at 
*6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2011) (“It is trickery to send an unsolicited business plan to someone 
the sender thinks is a potential business investor and then to foist confidentiality duties on 
that recipient without his agreement in advance.”); Klekas, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 1114 (“[T]he 
plaintiff must show: [among other things], that under all circumstances attending disclosure 
it can be concluded that the offeree voluntarily accepted the disclosure knowing the 
conditions on which it was tendered (i.e., the offeree must have the opportunity to reject the 
attempted disclosure if the conditions were unacceptable) . . . .”); see also Star Patrol, 1997 
WL 683327, at *1 (explaining that a valid implied-in-fact contract presupposes that the 
offeree was aware of the condition of confidentiality when the disclosure was imparted). 
 98. See, e.g., Omnitech, 11 F.3d at 1331; Zippertubing Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 757 F.2d 
1401, 1408 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that an implied duty of confidentiality existed where, 
among other things, the only purpose of a disclosure of confidential information was to 
facilitate a business relationship and procurement of services); Cloud v. Standard Packaging 
Corp., 376 F.2d 384, 388–89 (7th Cir. 1967); Carpenter Found. v. Oakes, 26 Cal. App. 3d 
784, 798 (Ct. App. 1972) (finding that a fiduciary confidential relationship existed where, 
among other things, the purpose of the disclosure of sensitive information was clearly to 
advance a relationship in which the recipient was to inform a restricted group of students); 
RTE, 267 N.W.2d at 233 (“[I]t is true that a relationship of confidence may be implied when 
a disclosure is made solely for the purpose of advancing or implementing an existing special 
relationship . . . .”). 
 99. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Doe v. Roe, 
400 N.Y.S.2d 688, 674–75 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (finding that in the dynamics of psychotherapy 
“[t]he patient is called upon to discuss in a candid and frank manner personal material of the 
most intimate and disturbing nature . . . [.] He is expected to bring up all manner of socially 
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seemed to recognize that if confidentiality is necessary to encourage disclosure or 
if it is necessary for any given disclosure to be effective, then an inference of 
confidentiality is more reasonable than it is in relationships where confidentiality 
seems unnecessary.100 
There is no more paradigmatic example of this factor than disclosing deeply 
personal information for purposes of therapy or diagnosis. The relevant cases 
recognize this fact,101 which is equally applicable online. Internet users regularly 
turn to websites and online disclosures as a way to seek therapeutic help from peers 
and professionals. For example, the Online Intergroup of Alcoholics Anonymous 
considers confidentiality imperative to its mission to help alcoholics recover 
through shared stories of their experiences and struggles.102 
vi. Solicitation 
Some courts analyzing a claim for implied confidentiality considered whether 
and how information was solicited, although no court considered this factor as 
solely determinative.103 Instead, it was seen as one of many factors relevant in their 
analysis.104 Courts seemed to deduce that solicited information was likely more 
                                                                                                                 
unacceptable instincts and urges, immature wishes, perverse sexual thoughts[—]in short[,] 
the unspeakable, the unthinkable, the repressed” (omission in original) (citation omitted)). 
 100. See, e.g., Knapp Schenk & Co. Ins. Agency v. Lancer Mgmt. Co., No. Civ.A. 02-
12118-DPW, 2004 WL 57086, at *7 (D. Mass. Jan. 13, 2004); Sentinel Prods. Corp. v. 
Mobil Chemical Co., No. Civ.A. 98–11782–PBS, 2001 WL 92272, at *12 (D. Mass. Jan. 17, 
2001) (“[W]here the facts demonstrate that a disclosure was made in order to promote a 
specific relationship, e.g., disclosure to a prospective purchaser to enable him to appraise the 
value of the secret, the parties will be bound to receive the information in confidence.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 101. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S. at 674–75. 
 102. Anonymity & Privacy, ONLINE INTERGROUP: ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, http://
www.aa-intergroup.org/privacy.php. 
 103. See, e.g., Meyer v. Christie, No. 07-2230-JWL, 2007 WL 3120695, at *4 (D. Kan. 
Oct. 24, 2007); Jackson v. LSI Indus., No. 2:03CV313FVO, 2005 WL 1383180, at *3 (M.D. 
Ala. June 9, 2005) (finding in a claim for breach of implied contract for confidentiality and a 
promise to pay for an idea that “[i]f Defendant is requesting that the Plaintiff disclose his 
idea, most Courts will find that such requests or solicitation implies a promise to pay for the 
idea, if the Defendant uses it” (citation omitted)); Moore v. Marty Gilman, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 
203, 215 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding in a claim for breach of implied confidentiality that 
“[d]efendants did not solicit plaintiffs or do anything to foster the impression that it was their 
regular practice to seek out and buy the ideas of others”); Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 
309, 323–24 (Ct. App. 1979) (“We do not believe that the unsolicited submission of an idea 
to a potential employee or potential business partner . . . presents a triable issue of fact for 
confidentiality.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Phillips v. Frey, 20 F.3d 623, 632 (5th Cir. 1994); Smith v. Snap-On Tools 
Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1987) (“When a manufacturer has actively solicited 
disclosure from an inventor, then made use of the disclosed material, the manufacturer may 
be liable for use or disclosure of the secret in the absence of any expressed understanding as 
to confidentiality.”); Research, Analysis & Dev., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 54, 56 (Cl. 
Ct. 1985) (finding that although unsolicited data was disclosed, an implied-in-fact contract of 
confidentiality was formed on other factors such as preexisting laws governing confidential 
disclosure to the government); DPT Labs., Ltd. v. Bath & Body Works, Inc., No. CIV.SA-
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sensitive than unsolicited disclosures and, as a result, this information was more 
likely to be seen as being implicitly disclosed in confidence. Or, perhaps courts felt 
more comfortable placing the onus of rebutting an inference of confidentiality on 
those who solicit information.105 
This consideration is relevant online as a variety of merchants and software 
vendors solicit information, often for reasons unrelated to the purpose of their 
featured goods or services.106 For example, if a gaming application for a 
smartphone asks to collect and use GPS location data, the fact that the information 
was solicited rather than voluntarily offered might play into whether the application 
developer is subject to an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
vii. Public Policy 
Some courts explicitly considered public policy when analyzing implied 
confidentiality disputes.107 Public policy was less important in disputes involving 
implied-in-fact agreements for confidentiality than it was in what courts identified 
as implied-in-law agreements and fiduciary relationships.108 Public policy was 
invoked when the dynamics of a particular relationship were such that justice 
demanded it, not when there was a mutual agreement of confidentiality between the 
parties.109 
                                                                                                                 
98-CA-664-JWP, 1999 WL 33289709, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 1999) (“Confidentiality 
may be implied when the recipient actively solicits the disclosure.”). 
 105. Those who solicit information as part of a transaction have the power to shape their 
offer and, as a result, are in a better position to explicitly dispel any notion of confidentiality. 
The absence of solicitation was also seen as a significant factor by courts. Courts typically 
found that unsolicited disclosures did not support a finding of implied confidentiality. See, 
e.g., Smith, 833 F.2d at 580 (finding no implied confidential relationship where the plaintiff 
“disclosed the invention of his own initiative” without discussing “pecuniary recompense for 
his suggestion”); Rogers v. Desa Int’l, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 955, 957 (E.D. Mich. 2002) 
(emphasizing the unsolicited nature of the disclosed information in rejecting a claim for 
implied confidentiality); Moore, 965 F. Supp. at 215. 
 106. See PRIVACYSCORE, http://www.privacyscore.com/. 
 107. See, e.g., Alsip v. Johnson City Med. Ctr., 197 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tenn. 2006). 
 108. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803 (App. Div. 1982); Doe v. 
Roe, N.Y.S.2d 668, 677 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Alsip, 197 S.W.3d at 726 (observing that that the 
covenant of confidentiality between physicians and patients “arises not only from the 
implied understanding of the agreement between patient and doctor, but also from a policy 
concern that such private and potentially embarrassing information should be protected from 
public view” (citing Givens v. Mullikin, 75 S.W.3d 383, 407 (Tenn. 2002))); Ghayoumi v. 
McMillan, No. M2005-00267-COA-R3CV, 2006 WL 1994556, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 
14, 2006). 
 109. See Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., No. CV-00-02279 CAS JWJX, 2000 WL 979664, at 
*7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2000) (holding that “[a]n action for breach of confidence ‘is not based 
upon apparent intentions of the involved parties; it is an obligation created by law for 
reasons of justice’ and ‘where in fact the parties made no promise.’” (quoting Entm’t 
Research Grp., Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1227 (9th Cir. 1997))). 
The court further specified that “a breach of confidence claim is not limited to circumstances 
where a fiduciary relationship exists between parties.” Id. 
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2. Nature of the Information 
While all obligations of confidentiality involve the disclosure of information, 
not all information is of the same level of sensitivity. Some information is very 
sensitive, such as intimate sexual thoughts and health-related information. Other 
information is mundane and uninteresting, such as an individual’s daily routine. 
Some information is completely public, like the price of goods and services. Other 
information is proprietary, secret, or both, such as a company’s trade secrets. This 
Part analyzes how the nature of information, which can vary greatly, can affect the 
judicial analysis of implied obligations of confidentiality. 
Within her framework, Nissenbaum sometimes refers to the nature of 
information as the “attributes of the information” or “information types.”110 
According to Nissenbaum, the nature of the information concerns what the 
information was about, or, as James Rachels has put it, “the kind and degree of 
knowledge.”111 The concept of the nature of the information is expansive. It seems 
virtually impossible to create an exhaustive taxonomy for the category.112 Thus, the 
goal of this Part is simply to identify which attributes had a noticeable impact on 
the courts’ decisions. 
The cases revealed that courts regularly and often explicitly relied on the nature 
of the information when analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality.113 Judicial 
analysis of the nature of the information occurred in many different types of 
disputes, including suits involving banking relationships,114 implied covenants of 
confidentiality in medical-care contracts,115 trade secret misappropriation,116 patent 
                                                                                                                 
 
 110. NISSENBAUM, supra note 8, at 143. 
 111. Id. (quoting James Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 328 
(1975)). 
 112. Indeed, Nissenbaum did not even define the “nature of the information,” stating: 
Those who may be expecting a precise definition of information type or attribute 
will be disappointed, for I rely throughout on an intuitive sense, assuming that it is 
as adequate for the explication of contextual integrity as for many important 
practices and polices successfully managed in society with nothing more. One 
need look no further than the endless forms we complete, the menus we select 
from, the shopping lists we compile, the genres of music we listen to . . . and the 
terms we submit to search engines to grasp how at ease we are with information 
types and attributes. . . . In general, attribute schemes will have co-evolved with 
contexts and not be readily accessible to fixed and finite representations. 
Id. at 144−45. Nissenbaum noted this problem herself when she stated that the concept of the 
nature of the information “recognizes an indefinite array of possibilities.” Id. at 143. 
 113. See, e.g., Resnick v. Resnick, No. 85 CIV. 9026 (RJW), 1990 WL 164968, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1990). 
 114. See, e.g., id.; Twiss v. State, 591 A.2d 913 (N.J. 1991); Graney Dev. Corp. v. 
Taksen, 400 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1978); McGuire v. Shubert, 722 A.2d 1087 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1998). 
 115. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (App. Div.1982); Doe v. Roe, 
400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Alsip v. Johnson City Med. Ctr., 197 S.W.3d 722 (Tenn. 
2006). 
 116. See, e.g., Rogers v. Desa Int’l, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 955 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Daily 
Int’l Sales Corp. v. Eastman Whipstock, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App. 1983). 
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ownership and infringement,117 requests for information under the Freedom of 
Information Act,118 and general contract and business-related disputes.119 
Consistent with the courts’ consideration of context, courts tended to find implied 
obligations of confidentiality in situations involving information that, if disclosed, 
could harm a vulnerable party. Courts also seemed to protect information that 
intrinsically could be expected to remain confidential, which is another trait of 
sensitive and proprietary information. Finally, courts seemed to recognize that an 
inference of confidentiality was much more reasonable when the disclosed 
information intrinsically evoked a heightened sense of gravitas in the recipient. 
i. Secret Information 
Courts placed great significance on whether the information disclosed was a 
secret. For the purposes of this analysis, a secret is defined as “[s]omething that is 
kept out of the knowledge or sight of others or is known only to oneself or a 
few.”120 Many of the cases in which secrecy was a relevant factor in a claim for 
implied confidentiality were disputes involving trade secrets. Part of the reason 
courts considered secrets important in these disputes is that information must be 
generally unknown or the owner must have attempted to protect the information in 
order for it to be eligible for trade-secret protection.121 In determining whether 
information was adequately protected, courts were often asked to determine if an 
agreement of implied confidentiality was reasonable in a given context.122 This is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. See, e.g., Google, Inc. v. Traffic Info., LLC, No. CV09-642-HU, 2010 WL 743878 
(D. Or. Feb. 2, 2010); FMC Corp. v. Guthery, No. 07-5409 (JAP), 2009 WL 485280 (D.N.J. 
Feb. 25, 2009); Diodem, LLC v. Lumenis, Inc., No. CV03-2142 GAF (RCx), 2005 WL 
6220720 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2005). 
 118. See, e.g., Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Cal. v. FBI, 749 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (S.D. 
Cal. 2010); Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (D. Colo. 2010); 
Roth v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 656 F. Supp. 2d 153, 165 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 119. See, e.g., Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); Faris v. Enberg, 97 
Cal. App. 3d 309 (Ct. App. 1979). 
 120. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1583–84 (Joseph 
P. Pickett ed., 5th ed. 2011). It is important to differentiate the concept of secrecy from the 
larger concept of privacy, which includes secrets as well as other concepts such as control 
over information, blackmail, and the right to make decisions about one’s body and family. In 
distinguishing between secrets and private information, the Supreme Court of Oregon stated 
in Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, “Secrecy involves intentional concealment. 
‘But privacy need not hide; and secrecy hides far more than what is private.’” 696 P.2d 527, 
529 (Or. 1985) (in banc) (quoting SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT 
AND REVELATION 11 (1983)). 
 121. See, e.g., Keane v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 921, 939 (S.D. 
Tex. 2004) (“The critical threshold requirement for pursuing [a claim for misappropriation of 
a trade secret or misappropriation of an idea] is secrecy/confidentiality.”). 
 122. See, e.g., Diodem, 2005 WL 6220720, at *10 (analyzing how secret information was 
protected for purposes of an implied obligation of confidentiality in the context of a patent 
dispute); Universal Reins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 95 Civ. 8436 (WHP), 
1999 WL 771357, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1999); Williams v. Coffee Cnty. Bank, 308 
S.E.2d 430, 432 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). 
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particularly true when dealing with ideas that were pitched to potential investors or 
businesses.123 
ii. Highly Personal Information 
Some courts considered the presence of highly personal information an 
important factor in the creation of an implied obligation of confidentiality. Highly 
personal information seemed to be most significant to courts when dealing with 
health-related information.124 However, the courts’ logic could extend to any 
personal information, such as intimate thoughts or conversations, embarrassing 
personal facts, or even financial information.125 
It appears that when considering obligations of confidentiality that were 
implied-in-fact, courts looked at whether the sensitive nature of the information 
would serve as a signal to the recipient that the information was disclosed in 
confidence.126 This is because implied-in-fact obligations are based on the 
understanding between the parties. Here, social norms can play a large role in 
determining whether an implied obligation of confidentiality was reasonable or 
likely.127 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. See, e.g., Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin, No. 00 Civ. 0676(JCF), 2001 WL 1425381, at 
*5 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 14, 2001) (finding no implied confidentiality where an idea was disclosed 
in a letter to others besides the alleged confidant). 
 124. See, e.g., Crippen v. Charter Southland Hosp., Inc., 534 So. 2d 286 (Ala. 1988); 
MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803–06 (App. Div. 1982); Alsip v. Johnson City 
Med. Ctr., 197 S.W.3d 722 (Tenn. 2006) (recognizing an implied covenant of confidentiality 
in medical-care contracts between physicians and their patients due to the intimate nature of 
the information shared within the relationship). 
 125. See, e.g., Constitutional Def. Fund v. Humphrey, Civ. A. No. 92-396, 1992 WL 
164734, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 1992) (“The general view . . . is that a bank has an implied 
contractual duty of confidentiality and can be held liable to its customer for disclosing 
information on the customer’s accounts without the customer’s consent or other 
justification.”); Twiss v. State, 591 A.2d 913, 919–20 (N.J. 1991) (recognizing that New 
Jersey has recognized an implied obligation of confidentiality in bank records); Doe v. Roe, 
400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 674–75 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (observing that implied covenants of 
confidentiality are particularly important and necessary for the psychiatric relationship, “for 
in the dynamics of psychotherapy ‘[t]he patient is called upon to discuss in a candid and 
frank manner personal material of the most intimate and disturbing nature . . . [.] He is 
expected to bring up all manner of socially unacceptable instincts and urges, immature 
wishes, perverse sexual thoughts[—]in short, the unspeakable, the unthinkable, the 
repressed.’” (omission in original) (citing Melvin S. Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers on 
the Practice of Psychiatry, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 401, 405–06 (1957))); McGuire v. Shubert, 722 
A.2d 1087, 1090–91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (“Based on common law principles of contract 
and agency, a number of jurisdictions have held that a bank has an implied contractual duty, 
as a matter of law, to keep financial information concerning a depositor confidential.”); 
Overstreet v. TRW Commercial Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2008). 
 126. See, e.g., Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1266 (D. 
Colo. 2010) (“[T]he text of the emails undermine any implication that the documents were 
meant to be protected by [a confidential] privilege.” (citation omitted)). 
 127. Courts seemed to reason that sensitive information was more likely than 
nonsensitive information to have been disclosed according to an implicit promise of 
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Highly personal information is shared online for various purposes. Much of this 
disclosure is intended for a closed group and, although it leaves the discloser 
vulnerable, is shared for various benefits. Consider the online community Veterans’ 
Children, a group for the children of war veterans whose purpose is to “serve as a 
resource for healing and a forum for sharing stories.”128 It is likely that much of the 
information shared within this community is highly personal, which would likely 
be part of a court’s calculus in determining whether the other members of the 
community were bound to an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
iii. Proprietary or Useful Information 
Some courts considered the proprietary and useful nature of information when 
determining whether implied obligations of confidentiality existed.129 Proprietary 
information is information individuals and businesses consider to be their property. 
Useful information is any information that had a utility for individuals and 
organizations and is typically commercial in nature. Much like with sensitive 
information, the disclosure of proprietary information can serve as a signal to 
recipients of the information that the disclosure is expected to be confidential. 
Specifically, in commercial settings, courts seemed to hold that proprietary and 
useful information was likely to be disclosed via an implied obligation of 
confidentiality. 130 
                                                                                                                 
confidentiality. The rationale for this logic is that the recipient would or should have realized 
that sensitive information is routinely disclosed in confidence; thus, an express promise of 
confidentiality need not be made. Instead, as a matter of course, it is reasonable to expect 
and rely on implied confidentiality when disclosing sensitive information. 
 128. VETERANS’ CHILDREN, http://www.veteranschildren.com/wordpress/. 
 129. See, e.g., Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., 783 F.2d 285, 300 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding 
that “New York law implies a requirement that ‘when one submits an idea to another, no 
promise to pay for its use may be implied, and no asserted agreement enforced, if the 
elements of novelty and originality are absent’” (quoting Downey v. Gen. Foods Corp. 31 
N.Y.2d 56, 61 (1972))); Research, Analysis, & Dev., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 54 (Cl. 
Ct. 1985) (referencing the propriety nature of the plaintiff’s information in finding that an 
implied-in-fact contract existed prohibiting the Air Force from disclosing the plaintiff’s 
proposal regarding aerospace research and development); Sentinel Prods. Corp. v. Mobil 
Chem. Co., No. Civ. A. 98-11782 PBS, 2001 WL 92272 (D. Mass. Jan. 17, 2001) (finding 
that an implied confidential relationship could exist where one business received information 
about a product from a potential seller with knowledge that the product was eligible for 
patent protection and reason to know that the seller was disclosing a trade secret); Kleck v. 
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 819, 827 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (“[T]he great weight of 
authority requires that an idea be novel before it will be protected under a breach of 
confidence or other quasi-contractual theory.”); Prescott v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 
404, 410 (D. Mass. 1990) (finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether 
an implied-in-fact contract of confidentiality existed where the discloser of information 
made the proprietary nature of the information clear to the recipients). 
 130. See Hoeltke v. C.M. Kemp Mfg. Co, 80 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1935); cf. Desny v. 
Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 270 (Cal. 1956) (“The law will not imply a promise to pay for an idea 
from the mere facts that the idea has been conveyed, is valuable, and has been used for 
profit; this is true even though the conveyance has been made with the hope or expectation 
that some obligation will ensue.” (emphasis added)). 
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Many of these courts focused on, among other things, the signaling effect of the 
valuable and proprietary nature of the disclosed information in order to find an 
implied obligation of confidentiality.131 The courts seemed to reason that because 
the information was valuable, it should be obvious that individuals would not 
disclose it to the potential recipients without restrictions on its use. Thus, it was 
reasonable in some contexts to find an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
iv. Information Exposing Discloser or Subject to Physical Harm 
Some information is kept confidential because revealing it could subject the 
discloser or subject of the information to physical harm from a third party.132 For 
example, the identity of police informants and related pieces of information often 
are kept confidential because if they were to be made public, criminals implicated 
by the informant might seek to harm them. Courts considered this factor significant 
in the cases in which the courts were called upon to determine if an implied 
obligation of confidentiality existed between the discloser and recipient of 
information. All of these cases involved disputes under the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA). In these cases, requests were filed for the identities and other 
information concerning confidential government informants. The agencies 
responded to the requests by invoking a FOIA exemption to disclosing the 
information. The agencies claimed an implied obligation of confidentiality between 
the government and their confidential sources. 
Courts justified their finding of implied confidentiality under the rationale that 
disclosure of the requested information would likely cause substantial harm to the 
sources who disclosed information to the FBI.133 Courts seemed to reason that the 
threat of harm to the discloser of information was so great that it was reasonable to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. See, e.g., Research, 8 Cl. Ct. 54. 
 132. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165 (1993); Council on Am.-
Islamic Relations, Cal. v. FBI, 749 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (S.D. Cal 2010); Skinner v. U.S. Dep’t. 
of Justice, 744 F. Supp. 2d 185, 212–13 (D.D.C. 2010) (recognizing that an implied grant of 
confidentiality for confidential sources has been recognized with respect to the cocaine trade, 
gang-related murder, methamphetamine trafficking operations, and other violent acts 
committed in retaliation for witnesses’ cooperation with law enforcement); Richardson v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 730 F. Supp. 2d 225, 237–38 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The nature of the crime 
investigated and informant’s relation to it are the most important factors in determining 
whether implied confidentiality exists. . . . In determining whether the source provided 
information under an implied assurance of confidentiality, the Court considers ‘whether the 
violence and risk of retaliation that attend this type of crime warrant an implied grant of 
confidentiality for such a source.’” (quoting Mays v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 234 F.3d 
1324, 1329 (D.D.C. 2000))); Roth v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 656 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D.D.C. 
2009); Rugiero v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 234 F. Supp. 2d 697, 704 (E.D. Mich. 2002) 
(observing that “implied assurances of confidentiality existed here because the information 
given by the DEA’s informants related to crimes that inherently involve violence and risk of 
retaliation”); Coleman v. FBI, 13 F. Supp. 2d 75, 82 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that plaintiff’s 
conviction for “numerous violent crimes” including murder, rape, and kidnapping, as well as 
“the relation of the witnesses thereto is precisely the type that the implied confidentiality 
exemption expressed in Landano is designed to encompass”). 
 133. See Council, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 1121–22. 
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infer that disclosure would not have occurred without an obligation of 
confidentiality. Thus, even if a promise of confidentiality was not explicit, it must 
have been implied. 
v. Information that is Likely to Be Shared 
Some courts that were called upon to determine if an implied obligation of 
confidentiality existed simply considered if the disclosed information was 
inherently the kind of information that would be shared with others.134 This kind of 
information was less likely to be subject to an implied obligation of confidentiality 
than information that is traditionally kept confidential. Whereas the other types of 
information contributed to the creation of an obligation of confidentiality, this type 
actually detracted from implied obligations of confidentiality. This type of 
information was not a neutral or “catch-all” category. Rather, some courts 
expressly discussed how information that is likely to be shared eroded the 
likelihood of an implied obligation of confidentiality.135 
3. Actors 
Often, assumptions of confidentiality are not based on the circumstances 
surrounding a disclosure of information or on the nature of what is being disclosed, 
but rather, on who is sending, receiving, or is the subject of the information. Every 
disclosure of information involves actors, and the attributes of these actors can 
affect implied obligations of confidentiality.136 
Actors play a large role in developing the contextual integrity of information. 
Within her framework, Nissenbaum stated that “[i]nformational norms have three 
placeholders for actors: senders of information, recipients of information, and 
information subjects.”137 Nissenbaum held that “[i]n specifying an informational 
norm, it is crucial to identify the contextual roles of [the sender, recipient, and 
subject] to the extent possible; that is, the capacities in which each are acting.”138 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. Google, Inc. v. Traffic Info., LLC, No. CV09-642-HU, 2010 WL 743878, at *3 (D. 
Or. Feb. 2, 2010) (finding no implied duty of confidentiality where the discloser should have 
reasonably anticipated, and perhaps intended, that disclosed information would eventually be 
disclosed to third parties). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 8, at 129–30. 
 137. Id. at 141. According to Nissenbaum, the sender and recipient can be single 
individuals, multiple individuals, or collectives such as organizations and companies. 
However, since privacy is an inherently personal concept, Nissenbaum believed that only 
people, not entities like corporations, could be the “subjects” of information under her 
theory. Id. at 141–42. 
 138. Id. at 141–42. Nissenbaum gave the healthcare context as an example. She stated 
that “there are numerous informational norms prescribing information sharing practices 
where the subjects and senders are patients themselves, and where the recipients are 
physicians. . . . Other norms apply in cases where the recipients are receptionists, 
bookkeepers, nurses, and so forth.” Id. at 142. The importance of actors also can be seen 
after the initial disclosure of information, that is, in the “downstream” disclosure of 
confidential information to third parties. For example, Nissenbaum noted that different 
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Our sense of privacy in disclosed information is almost always at least somewhat 
affected by the attributes and roles of the sender, subject, and recipient of 
information. As Nissenbaum stated, “Usually, when we mind that information 
about us is shared, we mind not simply that it is being shared but that it is shared in 
the wrong ways and with inappropriate others. . . . [M]ost of the time these 
requirements are tacit and the states of all parameters need not be tediously spelled 
out . . . .”139 
This Part identifies which actor attributes had a noticeable impact on the courts’ 
decisions. The cases revealed that vulnerability and an imbalance of power or 
sophistication were the most significant actor-related factors for courts analyzing 
obligations of confidentiality.140 Some disclosers of information were seen as 
inherently vulnerable, such as the infirm and elderly, while others were vulnerable 
because they were significantly less sophisticated or had fewer resources than the 
recipient of information. 
i. Vulnerability or Sophistication 
If one party to a disclosure of information was more sophisticated than the other, 
courts seemed to find that there was an imbalance between the parties and that the 
less sophisticated party was more vulnerable to harm.141 Additionally, some 
individuals were seen as inherently vulnerable—such as minors, the elderly, the 
feeble-minded, and the infirm. Courts found that vulnerable disclosers of 
information increased the likelihood of an implied obligation of confidentiality.142 
Additionally, courts seemed to find sophisticated recipients more likely than 
unsophisticated recipients to understand that their obligation of confidentiality was 
implied in a given context because sophisticated parties were more likely to be 
cognizant of norms of confidentiality in which information is disclosed.143 The 
                                                                                                                 
norms apply when a physician shares a patient’s information with fellow practitioners, 
insurance companies, and the physician’s spouse. Id. 
 139. Id. at 142. Nissenbaum maintained that “it is relevant to know whether the actors are 
government or private, and in what capacity they act, among an innumerable number of 
possibilities.” Id. at 143. 
 140. Courts most often merely mentioned an actor’s job title or level of sophistication, 
which seemed to indicate that the court at least recognized that attribute. Obvious examples 
of implied confidentiality based on the profession of a party included claims of implied 
confidentiality based on a specific evidentiary privilege, such as the attorney-client privilege. 
In Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Colorado denied a claim of implied confidentiality based on the attorney-client privilege 
where an e-mail was “shotgunned” to more than ten recipients, “only two of whom were 
attorneys.” 713 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1266 (D. Colo. 2010); see also Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. 
Mower, 219 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that employees categorically owe 
an implied duty of confidentiality to employers to protect their trade secrets and confidential 
information). 
 141. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 142. To reiterate, in all of the cases analyzed that involved personal information, the 
discloser and the subject of the information were the same person. All of the sensitive 
personal information revealed in the cases had been self-disclosed. 
 143. See, e.g., Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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recipient’s awareness of the need for confidentiality with vulnerable parties144 
could be the basis for an implied-in-fact confidentiality agreement or confidential 
relationship, but it also could subject the recipient to an obligation of 
confidentiality that was created by courts in the absence of an understanding 
between the parties.145 The attributes of actors in implied obligations of 
confidentiality were most significant in the healthcare context.146 Courts considered 
sophistication and vulnerability in relation to the other party, as opposed to in 
isolation.147 If both parties are equally vulnerable, or equally sophisticated, then it 
appears that courts are less likely to find an implied obligation of confidentiality 
than in relationships where the discloser is more vulnerable or sophisticated than 
the recipient.148 
ii. Resources 
Courts also found that an imbalance of resources between the parties contributed 
to a finding of an implied obligation of confidentiality. This was demonstrated in 
the practical distinction between individuals and corporate or group actors. No 
court explicitly analyzed individuals under different standards than corporations or 
groups in disputes involving implied obligations of confidentiality.149 However, in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. See, e.g., Sharma v. Skaarup Ship Mgmt. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 440, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988) (“New York recognizes an implied duty of confidentiality between a bank and its 
depositors, but not between a bank and its borrowers. Information about the status of a 
borrower’s loan is ‘not information that the borrower would normally expect would be kept 
confidential.’” (quoting Graney Dev. Corp. v. Taksen, 400 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (Sup. Ct. 
1978))); McGuire v. Shubert, 722 A.2d 1087, 1091 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (“It is 
inconceivable that a bank would at any time consider itself at liberty to disclose the intimate 
details of its depositors’ accounts. Inviolate secrecy is one of the inherent and fundamental 
precepts of the relationship of the bank and its customers or depositors.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Alsip v. Johnson City Med. Ctr., 197 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tenn. 2006) 
(“[T]he covenant of confidentiality arises not only from the implied understanding of the 
agreement between patient and doctor, but also from a policy concern that such private and 
potentially embarrassing information should be protected from public view.”); Overstreet v. 
TRW Commercial Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d 626, 634−35 (Tenn. 2008). 
 146. See, e.g., Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., No. 96-T-5582, 1998 WL 156997, at *12 
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1998) (finding that in confidential relationships between physicians 
and patients “there is no indication that patients bargain for confidentiality; rather, it is 
assumed”); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 534 (Or. 1985); 
Overstreet, 256 S.W.3d 626. 
 147. See, e.g., Harold ex rel. Harold v. McGann, 406 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
 148. While this logic was seemingly employed by most courts, it was often countered by 
other factors. For example, in Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp., the Fifth Circuit reversed a 
finding of implied confidentiality by the district court where a “relatively unsophisticated 
individual,” with little education, submitted an invention to a large corporation. 833 F.2d 
578, 580 (5th Cir. 1987). The district court accepted the plaintiff’s argument that “[u]nder 
the circumstances . . . the manufacturer should have known that he, as the inventor, expected 
compensation [or confidentiality] even if he did not request it.” Id. In reversing, the Fifth 
Circuit found that because the plaintiff disclosed his idea before requesting confidentiality, 
the court found no implied confidentiality existed. Id. at 581. 
 149. Some courts did note that commercial entities were less likely to need 
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practice, corporate or group entities typically had access to more resources than 
individuals, and in some cases, courts seemed to take this factor into 
consideration.150 For example, a focus on availability of counsel demonstrates how 
equality in resources can diminish the likelihood of an implied obligation of 
confidentiality between the parties. This seems particularly true when the parties 
are engaged in complex business negotiations instead of simple verbal 
exchanges.151 
iii. Bad faith 
A few courts considered whether an actor was acting in bad faith.152 Bad-faith 
recipients of information were more likely to be subjected to implied obligations of 
confidentiality than recipients acting in good faith.153 According to these courts, 
                                                                                                                 
confidentiality than individuals. See, e.g., Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Cal. v. FBI, 
749 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1122 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (noting that while it is possible for the 
government to claim an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act based on an implied 
promise of confidentiality to entities, that exemption “is claimed sparsely with regard to 
commercial institutions”). 
 150. See, e.g., Omnitech Int’l, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316, 1331 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(finding that that no confidential or fiduciary relationship existed because, among other 
things, “the record in this case is replete with evidence that Omnitech and Clorox had only 
an arms-length business relationship, including undisputed testimony that . . . both sides 
were represented by competent counsel in the drafting and consummation of the 
agreements”). The court also found that no fiduciary relationship existed because the parties 
vigorously negotiated the terms of their proposed agreement and Omnitech concealed much 
of its financial information from Clorox, which would seem to indicate that Omnitech did 
not view Clorox as a confidant. Id. 
 151. See, e.g., Formex Mfg., Inc. v. Sullivan Flotation Sys., Inc., Nos. 91-1469, 91-1471, 
1992 WL 131161 (Fed. Cir. June 16, 1992) (Neis, J., dissenting) (arguing against the 
majority’s decision that no implied duty of confidentiality existed because the parties were 
simply two businesses negotiating at arm’s length with no preexisting contracts). 
 152. See, e.g., Phillips v. Frey, 20 F.3d 623 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding an implied obligation 
of confidentiality apparently arising out of the potential purchaser’s actions taken in bad 
faith to convince plaintiff to disclose information); Flotec, Inc. v. S. Research, Inc., 16 F. 
Supp. 2d 992, 1006 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (observing that a jury can find an implied obligation of 
confidentiality “in view of evidence tending to show the defendant had not been sincere in 
its interest in buying the business and had used the negotiations merely as a guise for 
obtaining the secret manufacturing process”). 
 153. See, e.g., Bartell v. Onbank, Onbank & Trust Co., No. 95-CV-1807 (FJS), 1996 WL 
421189, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 1996) (“New York law does not appear to recognize an 
implied duty of confidentiality, a fiduciary duty, or any other duty of care between a bank 
and its borrowers, absent a showing of malice or bad faith.” (citing Graney Dev. Corp. v. 
Taksen, 400 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (Sup. Ct. 1978))). In Bartell, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of New York dismissed claims of breach of fiduciary duty and breach of an 
implied duty of confidentiality against a bank because the plaintiffs failed to allege any 
malice or bad faith on the part of the bank. However, it refused to dismiss the same claims 
against an individual employee of the bank who was the bank’s agent because it found that 
the employee acted with malice and ill will toward the plaintiff in obtaining the plaintiff’s 
loan request documents and distributing the materials at a mergers-and-acquisitions seminar 
as a demonstrative aid. Id. at *1, *4. 
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acting in bad faith to gain information—for example, by pretending to be interested 
in business negotiations—demonstrated that the information was not freely 
obtainable otherwise; thus, the information was likely disclosed in confidence.154 
4. Terms of Disclosure 
Terms regarding the disclosure of information are naturally present in express 
confidentiality agreements. However, terms can also shape an implied agreement of 
confidentiality. For example, a stamp of “confidential” on documents, by itself, is 
not sufficient to form an express confidentiality agreement. However, it might 
serve as evidence of an implied agreement of confidentiality. Often, terms of 
disclosure conflict with each other. Other times, external laws or codes of conduct 
regarding the disclosure of information can serve as “terms” that can create (or 
abolish) an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
Within her framework, Nissenbaum defines “terms” as constraints “on the flow 
(distribution, dissemination, transmission) of information from party to party in a 
context.”155 She also refers to terms as “transmission principles.”156 According to 
Nissenbaum, “The transmission principle parameter in informational norms 
expresses terms and conditions under which such transfers ought (or ought not) to 
occur.”157 While terms could be explicit, Nissenbaum found that they usually were 
implied.158 She stated, “The idea of a transmission principle may be the most 
distinguishing element of the framework of contextual integrity; although what it 
denotes is plain to see, it usually goes unnoticed.”159 Nissenbaum held that terms 
could stipulate many things: they could dictate that information could be shared 
freely. Alternatively, terms could stipulate that information can only be used if the 
subject of the information knows about the use (“notice”), or if the subject gives 
her permission for the use (“consent”).160 
Terms of disclosure can be explicit in, or inferred from, a virtually limitless 
number of contexts. Yet scholars have not analyzed exactly how courts consider the 
terms when analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality. No framework for 
such an analysis has been adopted by the courts. Thus, the goal of this Part is to 
determine which terms courts explicitly recognized as significant in implied 
confidentiality disputes. The cases revealed that courts typically tried to locate the 
true understanding of the parties by looking at terms within and outside of 
disclosure relationships. Courts placed the most emphasis on any term (statement, 
action, symbol, etc., indicating a preference regarding disclosure) that would have 
been apparent to the other party. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. NISSENBAUM, supra note 8, at 129, 145. 
 156. Id. at 145. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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i. Confidentiality Indicators 
Courts often looked for what I refer to as “confidentiality indicators,” that is, 
signals, statements, or actions that indicate either a desire for confidentiality or that 
the disclosed information would be kept confidential.161 
Terms Indicating a Desire for Confidentiality. Unsurprisingly, one of the most 
important terms of disclosure to courts was a desire or request for confidentiality by 
the discloser of information. A simple request for confidentiality does not, by itself, 
constitute a binding agreement between the parties. However, courts were 
significantly more likely to find an implied obligation of confidentiality when the 
discloser of information displayed a desire to restrict the flow of information than 
when the discloser showed no interest in confidentiality.162 Conversely, the absence 
of an indicator or signal of confidentiality by the discloser was relied upon by 
courts to find that no implied obligation of confidentiality existed.163 
                                                                                                                 
 
 161. See, e.g., Grayton v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 327 (Fed. Cl. 2010); Rogers v. Desa 
Int’l, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 955, 957 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (finding that a claim of implied 
confidentiality is without merit where, among other things, the plaintiff “did not indicate on 
the video tape he sent [to the defendant], either in the video itself or on an outside label, that 
the information contained therein was confidential”); Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 
664, 679–82 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding that no obligation of confidentiality existed for any 
disclosure not explicitly marked as “confidential” under a pre-existing agreement regarding 
use of disclosed information within a business relationship); Klekas v. EMI Films, Inc., 150 
Cal. App. 3d 1102, 1114 (Ct. App. 1984); Niemi v. Am. Axle Mfg. & Holding, Inc., No. 
269155, 2007 WL 29383 at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2007) (finding no implied obligation 
of confidentiality where, among other things, plaintiffs “did not make any concrete efforts to 
preserve the confidentiality of the designs provided to defendants” nor did they “mark the 
documents as confidential, or require an express agreement of confidentiality”); Daily Int’l 
Sales Corp. v. Eastman Whipstock, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (finding no 
implied obligation of confidentiality where, among other things, “[n]o documents were 
stamped or labeled with the word ‘confidential’ or like warnings”). 
 162. See, e.g., Knapp Schenk & Co. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Lancer Mgmt. Co., No. Civ.A. 
02-12118-DPW, 2004 WL 57086 (D. Mass. Jan. 13, 2004); In re WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 
A.D.2d 5, 9–10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (per curiam) (“[T]he very scheme adopted for 
communicating the letter reveals a deliberate intention not to reveal the author’s personal 
identity. All these circumstances yield but one possible conclusion: that the author of the 
letter did not want his personal identity revealed and, therefore, that the letter was 
communicated under an implied understanding of confidentiality.”). 
 163. See, e.g., Grayton, 92 Fed. Cl. 327; Fail-Safe LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp., 744 F. 
Supp. 2d 831, 860 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (finding no implied duty of confidentiality existed 
where the plaintiff provided “no indication” to the defendant that the information provided 
by plaintiff was intended to be kept in confidence); FMC Corp. v. Guthery, No. 07-5409 
(JAP), 2009 WL 485280, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 2009) (“Here, the Court is not convinced 
that Guthery provided confidential information . . . . [W]hen he produced [documents] he did 
not request that they be marked ‘confidential.’”); MIT v. Harman Int’l Indus., Inc., 584 F. 
Supp. 2d 297, 304 (D. Mass. 2008) (finding that no implied obligation of confidentiality 
existed where “[n]o record evidence shows either that the researchers gave any instructions 
to keep any information that drivers gathered while using the Back Seat Driver system 
confidential”); Young Design, Inc. v. Teletronics Int’l, Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-970-A, 2001 WL 
35804500, at *5 (E.D. Va. July 31, 2001) (“There is no evidence in this record that plaintiff 
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These terms were created many different ways. Some terms were symbols or 
single words, such as a “confidential” stamp on documents.164 Other terms were 
vague assertions, such as “this is between us.”165 Other factors of contextual 
integrity—context, actors, and the nature of the information—served as evidence of 
an implied term of confidentiality in a relationship.166 Expressions of 
confidentiality are so important because they can provide evidence that the party 
“knew or should have known” that the disclosed information was confidential, a 
key question asked by the courts.167 One of the ways this knowledge is transmitted 
to the recipient of information is through terms of disclosure. 
Some of the confidentiality indicators identified by courts were signals, 
statements, or actions that indicated to recipients a desire by the discloser for 
confidentiality, or an assumption or expression that the disclosed information was 
confidential.168 The importance of a discloser’s communication of a desire for 
confidentiality also is reflected in some courts’ requirement that the recipient of the 
information be notified of the desire for confidentiality before the disclosure is 
                                                                                                                 
took any other efforts to create a confidential relationship with defendant. There were no 
proprietary use warnings on invoices, no letters or emails reminding defendant about 
confidentiality obligations, and no evidence of oral discussions with any other of defendant’s 
employees.”). 
 164. See, e.g., Research, Analysis, & Dev., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 54 (Cl. Ct. 
1985). 
 165. E.g., Lee v. State, 12 A.3d 1238, 1250–51 (Md. 2011) (“Detective Schrott’s words, 
‘This is between you and me bud. Only me and you are here, all right? All right?,’ on their 
face imply confidentiality . . . . No reasonable lay person would have understood those 
words to mean anything other than that the conversation, at that moment and thereafter, even 
if not before, was ‘between’ only Detective Schrott and Petitioner.”). 
 166. See, e.g., Diodem, LLC v. Lumenis Inc., No. CV03-2142 GAF (RCx), 2005 WL 
6220720, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2005) (finding an implied obligation of confidentiality 
could exist from a totality of the circumstances, where, among other things, none of the 
recipients of information had any basis for inferring the information was disclosed for free 
and unrestricted use) (citing Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986)); Hollomon v. O. Mustad & Sons (USA), Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 450, 460 (E.D. 
Tex. 2002) (finding no confidential relationship where the plaintiff failed to present any 
evidence that he informed the defendant his designs were being disclosed in confidence); 
Young Design, 2001 WL 35804500, at *5 (recognizing that indicators such as reminders 
about confidentiality obligations, oral discussions about confidentiality, or warnings on 
communications designating the information as confidential could demonstrate efforts to 
create a confidential relationship). 
 167. See, e.g., Fail-Safe, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 857 (“None of the letters or data . . . beared 
[sic] any symbol denoting that the information contained therein was confidential. Moreover, 
there is no evidence that FS even told AOS that the Colorado company considered the 
information in question confidential.”); Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 
F.2d 174, 177 (7th Cir. 1991); Sentinel Prods. Corp. v. Mobil Chem. Co., No. Civ.A. 98-
11782-PBS, 2001 WL 92272 (D. Mass. Jan. 17, 2001); Flotec, Inc. v. S. Research, Inc., 16 
F. Supp. 2d 992 (S.D. Ind. 1998); Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 309 (Ct. App. 1979); 
Furr’s, Inc. v. United Specialty Adver. Co., 385 S.W.2d 456, 459–60 (Tex. Ct. App. 1964) 
(“Confidential relationship is a two-way street: if the disclosure is made in confidence, the 
‘disclosee’ should be aware of it. He must know that the secret is being revealed to him on 
the condition he is under a duty to so keep it.”). 
 168. See supra note 161. 
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made. Courts were hesitant to enforce an implied obligation of confidentiality if the 
recipient did not have the opportunity to reject the proposed confidentiality 
agreement.169 
Terms Indicating Confidence Will Be Kept. Courts also looked to see if the 
recipient of information gave some indication the information disclosed would 
remain confidential than when such an indicator by the discloser was absent.170 
Terms recognizing that disclosed information was confidential also fulfilled the 
requirement that the recipient knew about the implied confidentiality.171 An 
assurance of confidentiality might seem counterintuitive to the concept of an 
implied obligation of confidentiality because the most obvious examples of 
assurances of confidentiality are explicit, for example, “I promise not to tell a soul.” 
However, not all assurances of confidentiality are express or clear. A potential 
recipient’s vague reassurances to the discloser that the information will be 
protected could form an implied obligation of confidentiality. This is true even if 
confidentiality was not expressly agreed upon otherwise. A wide range of 
statements, conduct, and symbols (“indicators”) could demonstrate an implied 
willingness to keep the confidence of information.172 Conversely, terms that 
indicated that the recipient did not intend to keep information confidential could 
decrease the likelihood of an implied obligation of confidentiality.173 
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. See, e.g., Faris, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 324 (“One could not infer from anything Enberg 
did or said that he was given the chance to reject disclosure in advance or that he voluntarily 
received the disclosure with an understanding that it was not to be given to others. . . . Only 
in plaintiff’s response to summary judgment is there reference to his own thoughts from 
which one might infer that he felt there was a confidence. But he never, so far as we can tell, 
communicated these thoughts to Enberg, and nothing of an understanding of confidence can 
be inferred from Enberg’s conduct.”). Of course, not all courts found that confidentiality 
indicators contributed to an implied obligation of confidentiality. Innospan Corp. v. Intuit, 
Inc., No. 10 C 10-04422 WHA, 2011 WL 856265, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2011) (stating 
that “[a] rote stamp [claiming confidentiality] cannot, in and of itself, create an implied-in-
fact contract”); see also Google, Inc. v. Traffic Info., LLC, No. CV09-642-HU, 2010 WL 
743878, at *1 (D. Or. Feb. 2, 2010) (finding that an e-mail marked “confidential” did not, by 
itself, create an implied obligation of confidentiality). 
 170. See, e.g., Research, Analysis, & Dev., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 54 (Cl. Ct. 
1985); Moore v. Marty Gilman, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 203, 213 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding no 
implied or express obligation where, among other things, “Coach Moore did not request, and 
Gilman did not give, assurances of confidentiality”). 
 171. See, e.g., Faris, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 324 (“[E]vidence of knowledge of confidence or 
from which a confidential relationship can be implied is a minimum prerequisite to the 
protection of freedom in the arts. . . . [N]othing of an understanding of confidence can be 
inferred from [defendant’s] conduct.”). 
 172. See, e.g., Kashmiri v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 156 Cal. App. 4th 809, 827 (Ct. 
App. 2007) (“The terms of an express contract are ‘stated in words,’ while the terms and 
existence of an implied contract are ‘manifested by conduct.’”); Research, Analysis, & Dev., 
Inc., 8 Cl. Ct. 54; Sentinel Prods. Corp. v. Mobil Chem. Co., No. Civ.A. 98-11782-PBS, 
2001 WL 92272 (D. Mass. Jan. 17, 2001); Flotec, Inc. v. Southern Research, Inc., 16 F. 
Supp. 2d 992, 1006−07. (S.D. Ind. 1998). 
 173. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Guthery, No. 07-5409 (JAP), 2009 WL 485280 (D.N.J. Feb. 
25, 2009); Chief of Staff v. Conn. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, No. CV 980492654S, 1999 
WL 643373 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 1999). 
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ii. External Terms 
Sometimes the terms of an agreement were not offered by the parties or did not 
originate within the relationship between the parties. Instead, they were supplied by 
reference to external laws, organizational codes, policies, and external 
arrangements and agreements. These “external terms” were often not expressed in 
the agreement between the parties, but they still contributed to an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. For example, in cases involving a physician’s implied 
obligation of confidentiality to his or her patient, courts looked to external laws, 
such as a state’s professional licensing requirements, statutes, and the Hippocratic 
oath to affirm the implied obligation.174 
These external terms increased the likelihood of an implied obligation of 
confidentiality. Disclosers of information are more likely to rely on implied 
confidentiality when external terms apply to the disclosure than when they do not. 
For example, most patients likely know that their physicians take the Hippocratic 
oath, which requires that doctors respect their patients’ confidentiality.175 Thus, a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 174. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio 
1965); Biddle v. Warrant Gen. Hosp., No. 96-T-5582, 1998 WL 156997 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 
27, 1998); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803–05 (App. Div. 1982) (citing 
several statutes and regulations requiring physicians to protect the confidentiality of patients’ 
information in finding that physicians impliedly promise to keep patients’ information 
confidential as a matter of, among other things, contract); Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 
(Sup. Ct. 1977); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985) (looking 
to external sources such as professional regulations to find a physician’s nonconsensual duty 
of confidentiality to his or her patient); Overstreet v. TRW Commercial Steering Div., 256 
S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2008) (looking to state statutes, such as the Patients’ Privacy Protection 
Act and the Workers’ Compensation Act, that convey a public policy favoring the 
confidentiality of medical information in order to support an implied-in-law covenant of 
confidentiality between a patient and a doctor); Alsip v. Johnson City Med. Ctr., 197 S.W.3d 
722, 726 (Tenn. 2006) (citing multiple sections of the Tennessee Code in finding an implied 
covenant of confidentiality in medical-care contracts between treating physicians and their 
patients, which, according to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, “are indicative of the General 
Assembly’s desire to keep confidential a patient’s medical records and identifying 
information”); Givens v. Mullikin ex. rel. Estate of McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d 383 (Tenn. 
2002) (finding an implied obligation of confidentiality via a contract between a patient and 
physician based on, among other things, statutes requiring the physician to respect the 
patient’s confidential information); cf. Suarez v. Pierard, 663 N.E.2d 1039, 1043 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1996) (finding that the state’s Pharmacy Practice Act does not create an implied contract 
of confidentiality between pharmacists and their patients because, among other reasons, the 
relevant provision was not in effect when the alleged contract was made); Ghayoumi v. 
McMillan, No. M2005-00267-COA-R3CV, 2006 WL 1994556, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 
14, 2006) (“[T]here can be no covenant of confidentiality, implied or agreed, because the 
relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant resulted from a court order that necessitated 
disclosure of Defendant’s communications with Plaintiff and his family members and 
mandated disclosure of his evaluations, report and recommendations to the Court and 
parties.”). 
 175. E.g., Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 801 (“Almost every member of the public is aware 
of the promise of discretion contained in the Hippocratic Oath, and every patient has a right 
to rely upon this warranty of silence. . . . Consequently, when a doctor breaches his duty of 
2014] REVIVING IMPLIED CONFIDENTIALITY 799 
 
patient’s inference of confidentiality is likely reasonable. External terms also 
increase the likelihood that the recipient of information knew or should have 
known of his or her obligation of confidentiality. 
Courts looked to various laws, organizational codes, policies, and external 
arrangements and agreements to shape their analysis of implied obligations of 
confidentiality.176 The common theme of all these cases was that if the discloser of 
information knew, or should have known, that the recipient was bound by some 
law, organizational code, policy, or external arrangement or agreement to keep the 
information confidential, then the law, policy, or regulation could be considered an 
external term regarding the disclosure of information and could create or dispel an 
implied obligation of confidentiality. 
iii. Conflicting Terms 
Often, a relationship can involve conflicting terms about whether certain 
information is confidential. Even if the parties have a previous agreement, implied 
confidentiality can be created or dispelled by terms that conflict with that previous 
agreement. When faced with conflicting terms, most courts looked at the most 
recent term regarding the disclosure of information to determine whether an 
implied obligation of confidentiality existed. A notable exception was in instances 
where explicit terms prohibited implied agreements of confidentiality.177 In such 
cases, courts typically refused to find an implied obligation of confidentiality. This 
research suggests that an implied obligation of confidentiality can be created by 
terms even if the parties are otherwise bound by a contract with no reference to 
confidentiality.178 
                                                                                                                 
secrecy, he is in violation of part of his obligations under the contract.”). 
 176. See, e.g., Suarez, 663 N.E.2d at 1044 (recognizing that “existing laws and statutes 
become implied terms of a contract as a matter of law”); United Am. Fin., Inc. v. Potter, 667 
F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that the Inspector General Act (IGA) helped create an 
implied obligation of confidentiality in submitted complaints because the IGA provides that 
such complaints are to be anonymous to the public at large); Grayton v. United States, 92 
Fed. Cl. 327 (Fed. Cl. 2010) (acknowledging that a restrictive legend added pursuant to an 
administrative regulation could help form an implied obligation of confidentiality); Biddle, 
1998 WL 156997 (referencing the Hippocratic oath and the confidentiality required to 
maintain a physician’s license in recognizing the tort of breach of confidentiality); Alsip, 197 
S.W.3d at 726. 
 177. See, e.g., Knapp Schenk & Co. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Lancer Mgmt. Co., No. Civ.A. 
02–12118–DPW, 2004 WL 57086 (D. Mass. Jan. 13, 2004); DPT Labs., Ltd. v. Bath & 
Body Works, Inc., No. Civ.SA-98-CA-664-JWP, 1999 WL 33289709, at *6 (W.D. Tex. 
Dec. 20, 1999) (stating that implied confidentiality can co-exist with express confidentiality 
agreements for similar disclosures in certain situations and, in the present case, that “the 
limitation on [Bath & Body Works]’s actions is not determined solely by the specific terms 
of the confidentiality agreements”); Prescott v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 404, 410 (D. 
Mass. 1990) (stating that where the contractual agreement between the parties “does not 
memorialize their entire relationship[, a] separate implied-in-fact contract governing the 
dissemination of information between the parties would not be contradictory”). 
 178. See, e.g., DPT Labs., 1999 WL 33289709. Terms of disclosure also could dispel an 
obligation of confidentiality, even if such an obligation was previously implied. See, e.g., 
Anderson v. Century Prods. Co., 943 F. Supp. 137, 151 (D.N.H. 1996) (“[A]n implied 
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iv. Explicitness 
Courts held that terms that purportedly create implied obligations of 
confidentiality must be clear and definite enough for the promises and required 
performances of each party to be reasonably certain.179 When courts were presented 
with terms regarding the disclosure of information, they looked to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties at the time the terms were offered.180 The expectations of 
the parties are typically determined by examining “the totality of the 
circumstances” and may be “shown by the acts and conduct of the parties, 
interpreted in the light of the subject matter and of the surrounding 
circumstances.”181 Part of this analysis looks to how explicit the representations at 
issue are.182 Highly specific terms dispelled any implied obligation of 
confidentiality in several of the cases analyzed.183 Courts would only infer a term of 
confidentiality between the parties only if it was abundantly clear that the parties 
intended to be bound to confidentiality.184 Vagueness of terms, however, was not 
                                                                                                                 
confidential relationship can be defeated if the parties, by agreement, expressly disclaim any 
such relationship.”); cf. Med. Store, Inc. v. AIG Claim Servs., Inc., No. 02-80513-CIV, 2003 
WL 25669175 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2003) (holding that subsequent agreements can imply 
modifications but not contradictions to previously existing confidentiality agreements). 
 179. See, e.g., Watson v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 207 P.3d 860, 868 (Colo. App. 2008); 
Moore v. Marty Gilman, 965 F. Supp. 203, 213 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding that, based on a 
number of contextual factors, the phrase “between you and I” was not explicit enough to 
create an implied obligation of confidentiality); Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 309 (Ct. 
App. 1979) (refusing to find an implied confidential relationship and no implied-in-fact 
contract where the plaintiff failed to specifically communicate his thoughts from which one 
might infer that the plaintiff felt there was a confidence). 
 180. See, e.g., Kashmiri v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 156 Cal. App. 4th 809, 832 (Ct. 
App. 2007). 
 181. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 388 (Cal. 1988) (quoting Pugh v. 
See’s Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329 (Ct. App. 1981). 
 182. See, e.g., Sanchez v. The New Mexican, 738 P.2d 1321, 1324 (N.M. 1987); Tecza v. 
Univ. of S.F., No. C 09-03808 RS, 2010 WL 1838778, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2010) 
(dismissing a claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract of confidentiality because the 
plaintiff failed to “specify any particular conduct” that would reflect the existence of the 
basic elements for such a claim); Goldthread v. Davison, No. 3:06-0805, 2007 WL 2471803, 
at *5–7 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 2007); Jackson v. LSI Indus., Inc., No. 2:03CV313FWO, 2005 
WL 1383180 (M.D. Ala. June 9, 2005) (finding that merely asking for a faxed sketch of an 
idea was not specific enough to warrant an implied promise to pay or keep the idea 
confidential). 
 183. See, e.g., Watson, 207 P.3d at 868; BDT Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 274 F. 
Supp. 2d 880, 894 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (“Because it is undisputed that the parties repeatedly 
entered into confidentiality agreements that expressly and unambiguously disclaimed any 
restrictions on Lexmark's use of information provided by BDT, it is axiomatic that no 
express or implied duty restricting Lexmark's use of such information can be found here.”). 
 184. See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, L.L.C. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., No. 94 C 6884, 
1998 WL 46894, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1998) (“PlayWood offers a vague assertion that 
because a confidentiality agreement existed, there was an intention to be bound. But 
PlayWood does not specify what the parties were bound to. . . . Thus, there is no evidence 
that there was a ‘meeting of the minds’ . . . .”); Bakare v. Pinnacle Health Hosps., Inc., 469 
F. Supp. 2d 272 (M.D. Pa. 2006); Bergin v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., No. 98 Civ. 
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always a bar to an implied obligation of confidentiality.185 According to some 
courts, a certain amount of vagueness is tolerated so long as the obligations and 
expectations of the parties can be ascertained.186 
III. THE REVIVAL OF IMPLIED CONFIDENTIALITY 
Notwithstanding the myriad of factors used to analyze implied obligations of 
confidentiality, no unifying framework has been adopted by the courts. Instead, 
courts seem to haphazardly highlight various facts that either contribute to or 
detract from a finding of an implied obligation of confidentiality. The relevant 
cases revealed that courts implicitly utilize considerations that fall within 
Nissenbaum’s four factors of context-relative informational norms: context, actors, 
nature of the information, and the terms of disclosure. Given this utilization, the 
theory of contextual integrity can help create a much-needed decision-making 
framework for courts analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality. 
A. Toward a Decision-Making Framework 
This Article proposes a framework that is designed as a test with four distinct 
factors. These factors are to first be analyzed independently, then collectively to 
determine if an implied obligation of confidentiality existed in a given dispute. Due 
to the importance of context, courts should engage in a case-by-case analysis of the 
factors, with no explicit preference for any particular factor. 
This framework is designed to help courts ascertain the two most important 
considerations in implied obligations of confidentiality according to the themes 
arising from its own analysis: party perception and inequalities. To that end, when 
courts are presented with a claim of an implied obligation of confidentiality, they 
should ask the following questions and consider the relevant factors discussed in 
Part II, which correspond to Nissenbaum’s framework: 
(1) What was the context surrounding the disclosure? 
(2) What was the nature of the information? 
(3) Who were the actors and what was their relationship? 
(4) What were the internal and external terms of disclosure? 
                                                                                                                 
8075(JGK), 2000 WL 223833 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2000) (denying a claim for breach of 
implied-in-fact contract for, among other things, confidentiality because the agreement 
between the parties was too vague and lacked essential terms such as payment); Graney Dev. 
Corp. v. Taksen, 400 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1978). 
 185. See, e.g., Copley Press, Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Super. Ct., 278 Cal. Rptr. 443 (Ct. 
App. 1991). 
 186. See, e.g., Lee v. State, 12 A.3d 1238, 1250–51 (Md. 2011) (“Detective Schrott’s 
words, ‘This is between you and me bud. Only me and you are here, all right? All right?,’ on 
their face imply confidentiality . . . . No reasonable lay person would have understood those 
words to mean anything other than that the conversation, at that moment and thereafter, even 
if not before, was ‘between’ only Detective Schrott and Petitioner.”). Regarding explicitness, 
courts generally acted consistently with Nissenbaum’s holistic approach, which incorporates 
other factors besides the terms of disclosure in implied obligations of confidentiality. 
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Courts would ask each question individually and then analyze their answers as a 
whole to determine if an implied obligation of confidentiality existed. Each question 
would seek to identify the judicial considerations explored in Part II that would be 
applicable in a given factual scenario. Ultimately, this framework requires an 
equitable balancing, which while somewhat indeterminate, would seem to provide 
more direction than the current approach. 
This framework will not completely eliminate uncertainty from the law 
surrounding implied obligations of confidentiality. The concept of implied 
confidentiality is too dependent upon specific facts for a completely consistent 
application of the law. However, the adoption of this decision-making framework 
can increase clarity and minimize uncertainty by asking the same questions in every 
dispute. 
B. Application 
This decision-making framework is necessary if the concept of implied 
confidentiality is to be clearly and consistently applied where it is most needed—on 
the Internet. The framework should be applied to online cases the same way it is 
applied to offline cases. Given the technology-neutral nature of the framework, there 
is no reason to systematically alter implied confidentiality analysis for online 
disputes. 
Consider the plight of Cynthia Moreno.187 Moreno published a missive about her 
hometown, titled “Ode to Coalinga,” on the journal section of her personal profile on 
the social network site MySpace.com. Roger Campbell, the principal of Coalinga 
High School, read the Ode before it was removed and forwarded it to the local 
newspaper, the Coalinga Record, which published the Ode in the newspaper’s 
letters-to-the-editor section. The Coalinga community reacted violently to the 
publication of the Ode, threatening Moreno and her family and ultimately causing 
the Moreno family to close its twenty-year-old family business.188 Moreno filed suit 
against Campbell alleging invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, ultimately losing on both claims. For the sake of exposition, assume 
Moreno also alleged breach of an implied obligation of confidentiality against 
Campbell, who presumably originally accessed Moreno’s post.189 
Under the proposed framework, first, the court would attempt to ascertain the 
context of the disclosure. There is some debate as to whether customs of 
confidentiality exist in social network sites.190 This is a factually specific inquiry, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 187. See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1125, 1128 (Ct. App. 2009); 
Pablo Lopez, Coalinga Grad Sues Principal Over MySpace Rant, FRESNO BEE (Sept. 19, 
2010), http://www.fresnobee.com/2010/09/19/2084251/jury-to-decide-on-coalinga-grads.html.  
 188. Moreno, 172 Cal. App. 4th at 1128–29. 
 189. Id. at 1128. Note that the claim here is against an audience member, not an 
intermediary. Had MySpace itself disclosed her poem to a third party, this analysis would be 
different. 
 190. See, e.g., Abril, supra note 5, at 77; Emily Christofides, Amy Muise & Serge 
Desmarais, Information Disclosure and Control on Facebook: Are They Two Sides of the 
Same Coin or Two Different Processes?, 12 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 341 (2009); 
McClurg, supra note 5; Zeynep Tufekci, Can You See Me Now? Audience and Disclosure 
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particularly because customs vary by site and user. However, given that seemingly 
no persuasive evidence was introduced at trial to support the notion that a custom 
of confidentiality existed on MySpace, this factor does not favor a finding of 
implied confidentiality. The disclosure was not made in the process of ongoing 
negotiations, nor was the disclosure solicited by Campbell. The Ode was simply a 
gratuitous post for friends to read. Indeed, there was no purpose for the disclosure 
other than to vent. Thus, the context weighs against a finding of an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. 
Next, the court would look to the nature of the information. Here, the 
information was arguably personal. The Ode was a confessional that divulged raw 
emotions and personal histories with classmates. Additionally, the information 
subjected Moreno and her family to potential physical harm as bricks were thrown 
at her house. However, it is debatable whether Campbell either knew or should 
have known this would be the result of his disclosure. Unlike revealing the identity 
of a government informant, it does not necessarily follow that disclosing an angry 
blog post will lead to physical violence against the blogger. Additionally, the 
confessional addressed Moreno’s adversaries in the second person, which might 
implicate a desire for them to read it. Thus, this factor cannot be seen as 
overwhelmingly in favor of an implied obligation of confidentiality. Any support 
for confidentiality should be seen as marginal. 
Third, the court would identify the attributes of the actors and their relationship 
to each other. Here, there is no evidence Campbell acted in bad faith to access the 
information. There does not appear to be any inequality between the parties. Both 
Moreno and Campbell seem to be relatively sophisticated parties with no advantage 
of resources or bargaining power over one another. Additionally, the parties have 
no history together. Indeed, it would appear that Moreno and Campbell were 
strangers. This factor weighs against a finding of an implied obligation of 
confidentiality. 
Finally, courts would seek to identify any internal or external terms of 
disclosure. Internally, there appear to be no confidentiality indicators. The court’s 
opinion did not indicate that Moreno utilized privacy settings to restrict access to 
her post, which might have indicated the confidential nature of her Ode. For the 
sake of analysis, assume her post was accessible to anyone with an Internet 
connection.191 Nor did Campbell give any indication that he was going to keep the 
information confidential. Moreno could have created a small group for disclosure 
of the Ode and premised invitations to the group upon an indication the group 
members would keep the information disclosed within confidential, but she did not. 
However, there was one external term that might weigh in favor of an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. The MySpace terms of use prohibit “publicly 
post[ing] information that poses or creates a privacy or security risk to any person,” 
violating “the privacy rights, publicity rights, [or] copyrights . . . of any person,” or 
“using or distributing any information obtained from the Myspace Services in order 
                                                                                                                 
Regulation in Online Social Network Sites, 28 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y 20 (2008). 
 191. Moreno, 172 Cal. App. 4th at 1130. It should be noted that Moreno claims she did 
use privacy settings. Eric Goldman, Cynthia Moreno Guest Lecture to My Internet Law 
Course, TECH. & MKTG. LAW BLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 11:35 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org
/archives/2013/04/cynthia_moreno_1.htm. If true, this would alter the analysis to slightly 
increase the likelihood of an implied confidence. 
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to harass, abuse, or harm another person or entity, or attempting to do the same.”192 
Thus, by accessing the Ode subject to these terms, Campbell was potentially legally 
bound to confidence via an agreement with MySpace. However, the facts do not 
indicate that this term was relied upon or even known by Moreno. Few, if any, 
users actually read the fine print. This matters because the courts focus on the 
perception of the parties. Nor do the facts indicate that Campbell intended to harm 
Moreno by redistributing the post. Ultimately, this factor weighs against a finding 
of an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
Looking at the factors as a whole, a court would likely conclude that Campbell 
was not bound by an implied obligation of confidentiality. Three of the four factors 
weigh against such a finding, and the sole factor that favored an implied 
confidentiality did so only marginally. This analysis demonstrates how the 
framework might be applied online. 
Contrast the Moreno case with a similar dispute that might have a different 
result under the framework: Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group.193 In this case, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey was asked to determine the 
privacy interest in information contained on a “closed” webpage on MySpace.com. 
A waiter at a local restaurant called Houston’s, Brian Pietrylo, created a group for 
him and his fellow employees to vent about their employer “without any outside 
eyes spying in on [them].”194 Pietrylo stated on the group’s page that “[t]his group 
is entirely private, and can only be joined by invitation.”195 The court noted that the 
icon for the group, which was Houston’s logo, “would appear only on the Myspace 
profiles of those who were invited into the group and accepted the invitation.”196 
Because each member accessed her or his own profile by entering in a username 
and password, Pietrylo effectively restricted the website to authorized users in 
possession of an invitation to the group and a password-protected MySpace 
profile.197 Under pressure at a party one night, a Houston’s greeter disclosed her 
password to her managers. Pietrylo was then fired for creating the group, which 
resulted in a lawsuit alleging that the managers violated the group’s privacy. The 
court found that “[p]laintiffs created an invitation-only internet discussion space. In 
this space, they had an expectation that only invited users would be able to read the 
discussion.”198 Ultimately, a jury found that Houston’s managers had violated the 
Stored Communications Act and the New Jersey Wire Tapping & Electronic 
Surveillance Act.199 However, the jury did not support Pietrylo’s claim for invasion 
of privacy.200 
                                                                                                                 
 
 192. Myspace Services Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE, https://myspace.com/pages
/terms (last updated June 10, 2013). 
 193. No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2008 WL 6085437 (D.N.J. July 25, 2008). 
 194. Id. at *1. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at *6. 
 199. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at *1 
(D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009). 
 200. Id. 
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Suppose the fired employees brought a claim for breach of an implied obligation 
of confidentiality against the hostess, or, for that matter, against the managers for 
inducement to breach confidentiality.201 The first factor of the framework—
context—would likely weigh in favor of an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
Like in Moreno, the facts do not reveal that access to the group was solicited by the 
hostess. However, unlike in Moreno, these disclosures were made for a specific 
purpose: to vent “without any outside eyes spying” on the members of the group.202 
Thus, confidentiality was seemingly necessary to further the purpose of the group. 
The second factor—the nature of the information—also favors a finding of 
implied confidentiality. Like in Moreno, the information disclosed here was 
personal in nature because it revealed the negative thoughts of the employees 
toward their manager. While the information might not inherently expose the 
discloser to physical harm, it certainly exposes the discloser to some form of 
retaliation, as evidenced by the fact that Pietrylo was fired for creating the group. 
Regarding the third factor—the attributes of the actors and their relationship to 
each other—there is no evidence the hostess acted in bad faith to receive an 
invitation to the group. Additionally, there does not appear to be any inequality 
between the parties. The hostess and the waiters who created the group were all 
employees of Houston’s of relatively the same status with no apparent advantage of 
resources or bargaining power over one another. Unlike in Moreno, however, the 
parties likely had at least a partially developed relationship. Ostensibly, the parties 
worked together and got to know each other at least slightly before the invitation to 
join the group was sent out. This factor weighs in favor of finding an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. 
The final factor—terms of disclosure—is applied the most distinctly from 
Moreno. The website in Pietrylo explicitly stated that “[t]his group is entirely 
private, and can only be joined by invitation.”203 The website also provided that the 
icon for the group, which was the restaurant’s trademarked logo, “would appear 
only on the Myspace profiles of those who were invited into the group and 
accepted the invitation.”204 The fact that the privacy settings were used to restrict 
access to the group also served as a confidentiality indicator. Although the word 
                                                                                                                 
 
 201. Additionally, under some theories of the breach of confidentiality tort in the United 
States and England, a claim for inducement of breach of confidentiality could be successful 
against the managers. See, e.g., Attorney-Gen. v. Observer Ltd., [1990] A.C. 109 (H.L.) 268 
(appeal taken from Eng.); Campell v. MGN Ltd., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1373, [2003] Q.B. 
633 [662] (Eng.); PAUL STANLEY, THE LAW OF CONFIDENTIALITY: A RESTATEMENT 1–5 
(2008); see also Patricia Sánchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to 
Online Interpersonal Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689 (2010); Richards & Solove, 
supra note 6, at 178 (“[A] third party can freely disclose private facts about a person as long 
as the third party did not learn the information from a confidant.”). 
 202. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2008 WL 6085437, at *1 
(D.N.J. July 25, 2008) (“Pietrylo stated in his initial posting that the purpose of the group 
would be to ‘vent about any BS we deal with out [sic] work without any outside eyes spying 
in on us. This group is entirely private, and can only be joined by invitation.’ Pietrylo then 
exclaimed ‘[l]et the s* *t talking begin.’”). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
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confidential was apparently not used, the confidential nature of the group postings 
was indicated throughout the website and invitation. This factor weighs heavily in 
favor of an implied obligation of confidentiality for every member of the group. 
Thus, three of the factors weigh in favor of an implied obligation of 
confidentiality, and one is neutral. Observing the factors as a whole, it is likely that 
a court would find an implied obligation of confidentiality under this framework. 
The Moreno and Pietrylo cases demonstrate the various ways the framework for 
implied obligations of confidentiality could be applied online in the same way it 
would be applied to offline cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Internet users often have implicitly shared expectations of confidentiality. Yet 
the law has failed to reliably recognize this reality. Because of this failure, the law 
of online relationships remains incomplete. Meanwhile, the doctrine of implied 
confidentiality is languishing. The concept has not been developed enough to be 
consistently applied in environments that often lack obvious physical or linguistic 
cues of confidence, such as the Internet. Courts have left little explicit guidance 
shaping the concept in their relevant opinions. However, there are enough clues in 
the case law to revive implied confidentiality with a unifying decision-making 
framework. 
The framework proposed in this Article would help courts ascertain the two 
most common and important judicial considerations in implied obligations of 
confidentiality—party perception and party inequality. The framework will better 
enable the application of implied confidentiality in online disputes than the 
currently vague state of the concept. The Internet need not spell the end of implied 
agreements and relationships of trust. Courts need only dig deeper into the nuances 
of our relationships. 
